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This thesis presents several problems based on papers written jointly by the
author and Dr. Christian-Oliver Ewald.
Firstly, the author extends the model presented by Fershtman and Nitzan (1991),
which studies a deterministic differential public good game. Two types of volatility
are considered. In the first case the volatility of the diffusion term is dependent on
the current level of public good, while in the second case the volatility is dependent
on the current rate of public good provision by the agents. The result in the latter
case is qualitatively different from the first one. These results are discussed in detail,
along with numerical examples.
Secondly, two existing lines of research in game theoretic studies of fisheries are
combined and extended. The first line of research is the inclusion of the aspect
of predation and the consideration of multi-species fisheries within classical game
theoretic fishery models. The second line of research includes continuous time and
uncertainty. This thesis considers a two species fishery game and compares the
results of this with several cases.
Thirdly, a model of a fishery is developed in which the dynamic of the unharvested
fish population is given by the stochastic logistic growth equation and it is assumed
that the fishery harvests the fish population following a constant effort strategy.
Explicit formulas for optimal fishing effort are derived in problems considered and
the effects of uncertainty, risk aversion and mean reversion speed on fishing efforts
are investigated.
Fourthly, a Dixit and Pindyck type irreversible investment problem in continuous
time is solved, using the assumption that the project value follows a Cox-Ingersoll-
Ross process. This solution differs from the two classical cases of geometric Brown-
ian motion and geometric mean reversion and these differences are examined. The
vi
aim is to find the optimal stopping time, which can be applied to the problem of
extracting resources.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Hanley, Sorgren and White (2007) have pointed out ”A market failure occurs when
the market does not allocate scarce resources to generate the greatest social welfare.
A wedge exists between what a private person does given market prices and what
society might want him or her to do to protect the environment. Such a wedge
implies wastefulness or economic inefficiency; resources can be reallocated to make
at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off.”, see [?], page 42.
Market failure may be caused by producing public goods. The main reason is that
private sector producers will not supply public goods to people because they cannot
be sure of making an economic profit. The notion of a public good was defined by
Samuelson in his seminal 1954 paper ”Collective consumption goods” [?]. According
to this a public good is a good which is non-rival and non-excludable. That is, any
consumer’s consumption does not lead to a reduction in the amount of the good
and each individual is allowed to take advantage of it. Some examples are academic
research and national reputation. The principal question for an economic agent is,
how much should he contribute to the public good? Potentially consumers can take
advantage of the public good without sufficient contribution. This issue is called
1
2the free rider problem. In environmental economics, climate change is a crucial
global public good and this represents one classical example of a market failure,
which leads all countries to benefit or suffer from it. Scientists have identified
that the Earth has warmed 0.5◦C over the past 100 years and green-house gas
(GHG) concentrations have also increased significantly over the past 200 years. The
United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has pointed
out ”the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence
on global climate.”, see [?] Technical Summary E. Many scientists are concerned
about reducing global GHG emissions in order to reduce the risk to human beings
and the environment. Climate change could be caused by GHG emissions and it is
indeed a threat to economic and ecological sustainability. How does climate change
affect the economy?
One example is renewable resources. Fish stocks, a globally important renewable
resource, have been affected by it. The ocean represents the main environmental
heat sink and scientists have noticed that since 1961, around 80 per cent of the
heat added to the climate system has been absorbed by the sea. This leads to an
increase in sea temperature. The UN News Centre reports that the distribution of
marine and freshwater fish has been affected by climate change and that biological
processes are also influenced, see [?]. These impacts affect the biomass of species
and therefore affect the harvest rates of fishery agents. GHG emissions accumulate
and remain in the atmosphere for several hundred years. A reduction in GHG
emissions may not cause the GHG concentrations to dissipate because they will
take time to decay. The risks to human beings and the environment are caused by
the aggregate stock of GHG and different rates of emissions may lead to the same
concentrations. Therefore, policymakers should focus on how to achieve a given level
of concentration. The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the United Nations Framework
3Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with the objective of stabilizing GHG
emissions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. However, developing countries such as China
and India will soon be the largest emitters in the world due to their great demand
for fossil fuels. Even though their intent to comply has been reported, ”EU presses
China and India to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”, see [?], the protocol is self-
enforcing and this leads to inefficiency. Climate protection is a public good and
some countries may free ride off the efforts of others and this leads to a public good
game.
As mentioned earlier, there are some environmental resources such as fisheries
that are suffering from climate change. Cod has been an important economic
commodity since the Viking period and some researchers indicate that the US
Atlantic cod population may drop by as much as 50 percent by 2050 due to climate
change, see [?]. In addition to this, such a severe impact will also affect other
species because of the interactions between species. There are various reasons why
multi species models should be studied. The general idea that individuals and
countries should adopt an ecosystem approach to the sustainable use of natural
resources in fact underpins many of the resolutions passed by the 2002 World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg. In particular, the
WSSD plan of implementation requires signatory nations to develop and implement
an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) by 2012. From the point of view of
conservation ecology, it is important to understand that the fishing of one species
may have significant effects on another species and that this must be taken into
account when thinking about the conservation of this species. There is no doubt
that ecosystems are affected by uncertainty and interaction among species. It is
impossible to operate a fishery without affecting the ecological equilibrium. In
4order to ensure the conservation of the target species, fishery management measures
should consider other species which belong to the same ecosystem or are associated
with the target. Sharks are a slow-growing and long-lived species and they produce
few offspring. They are a common seafood around the world in countries such as
Japan and Australia and they are often killed for shark fin soup. Since they are
apex predators and the population is comparatively small, a decrease in the stock
of sharks leads the stocks of other species to increase or decrease significantly. On
the other hand, to avoid the extinction of species, it is necessary to consider the
behaviour amoung fishery agents. Each agent’s harvest rate will affect other agents’
decisions and this may cause species to become extinct. In order to understand
the impact of fishery agents’ behaviour on species, it is necessary to study a fishery
game.
Even though people could benefit from a public good, they may suffer when
the ’benefit’ becomes too great. Tourism is one of the major contributions to the
GDP of countries such as Greece and Spain. Both local residents and governments
enjoy the economy improvements caused by tourists and may promote these holiday
destinations to attract more holidaymakers. In other words, the residents and
government benefit from the reputation of these destinations and the reputation
represents a public good. However, a larger value of such good, i.e., a higher
reputation, will be associated with a higher demand for facilities such as tourist
accommodation and environmental problems such as pollution, loss of biodiversity
and resource depletions are caused by a larger number of tourists and consequent
over-development. The Mediterranean coastal zone, one of the invaluable assets
around the world due to its biodiversity and cultural heritage, has suffered from
over-development. Evidence of this has been identified in [?], ”These demographic
and tourist trends result in highly increasing infrastructures and facilities on the
5coastal zone. As regards transport, intensively used roads now run along a large
part of the Mediterranean coast at no more than a kilometre from the shoreline.
Often constructed too close to the shores, the roads disrupt the physical exchanges
between land and sea and generate a linear urbanisation along the coast. Certain
airports, built on wetlands, contribute to the disappearance of ecosystems of great
ecological and economic value”.
Another key topic in environmental economics is non renewable resources because
the consumption of these resources permanently reduces the available stock. The
extraction of such resources may be influenced by several factors, e.g., the price in
the market. Such decisions can be regarded as irreversible investments, since they
are related to big capitals and therefore the real option theory can be applied to
investigate the problem of extracting non renewable resources. The main philosophy
of the real options approach is that a financial manager faces the decision of and
when to invest in a financial project. As opposed to the well known theory of options
on stocks, it is generally assumed that the assets underlying real options are not
traded on relatively liquid markets and, furthermore, that investment decisions are
generally irreversible. Problems that fall into this category range from investment
in real estate to problems of environmental economics and the reduction of GHG
emissions, see Dixit (2000) [?]. Resources represent another typical example of
real options. For example, oil could be considered as an option to invest in the
development of a reserve, see [?], chapter 12. Agents decide when they should
extract the oil due to the price of oil in the market. Real option theory can also
be applied to the problem of renewable resources. Li (1998) studied a model in a
fishery where he proposes that the stock of fish follows a geometric Brownian motion
and this affects the agents’ decision about when and how much fish they are going
to catch, see [?].
6The motivation for this thesis is that environmental economics is becoming more
and more popular and, because the stock of resources are limited, it will be necessary
to introduce management policies. In the real world, time is continuous and it would
be interesting to consider a continuous model. Two main techniques have been
adopted in this thesis are: the real option approach and differential game theory,
and these will be introduced in the following subsections. The following chapters
are based on papers written jointly with the author’s supervisor, Dr. Christian-
Oliver Ewald, and they are available at SSRN. Two applications of differential
game theory are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, these are public goods and fishery
games. In Chapter 2, it is considered that the public good satisfies the premise
that an individual’s consumption may be reduced if the value of the good exceeds
a given level. One example of such a public good is conservation, because slow
development of an economy may result from over-conservation of environmental
resources. Chapter 3 examines a two species ecological system in which there are
interactions between the two species. The analysis investigates how the ecological
interactions affect fishery agents’ decisions and how these decisions influence the
ecological system. In order to combine climate change and ecological interactions
among species, a stochastic model is considered where climate change represents
one of reasons for the uncertainty. Following on from the numerical example in
Chapter 3, an extension of the Gordon-Schaefer model is presented in Chapter 4
to provide a policy for fishery management. In Chapter 5, the proposition that a
financial project follows a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is discussed.
1.1. Real option theory
Real option theory originated with the work of Myers (1977) [?] and is becoming
more and more popular. There is no doubt that time always plays a crucial role
7when a firm makes its investment decision. The decisions a firm makes in the present
are affected by uncertainty and also by decisions made by other firms later on. To
make the decision, the firm has to look ahead to all future possibilities and decide,
whether the firm’s investment should be postponed or not. To introduce real option
theory, this section will first give a brief introduction to two techniques, dynamic
programming and contingent claims analysis, and look at how they can be applied
to identify the optimal stopping time.
Dynamic programming has been widely used in dynamic optimization, particu-
larly when dealing with uncertainty. Starting with the simplest case, a two-period
example, suppose that I ≥ 0 is the sunk cost at each period and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is
a discount rate given exogenously. An agent faces the situation where he can
determine whether he should invest at t = 0 or wait until t = 1. Suppose that
the value of the project at t = 0 is given by P0 and at t = 1, it is
P1 =

 (1 + u)P0, with probability p(1− d)P0, with probability 1− p ,
Suppose that the agent has decided to invest in the project at t = 0 and let V0 be
the present value of the revenues he receives. The value V0 discounted back to t = 0
can be derived by
V0 = P0 + [p (1 + u) + (1− p) (1− d)]P0
∞∑
i=1
1
(1 + ρ)i
=
[1 + ρ+ p (u+ d)− d]
ρ
P0
and the payoff for the agent is defined by max {V0 − I, 0}. It can be seen that the
agent invests only if V0 is greater than the sunk cost I. On the other hand, if the
agent does not invest at t = 0 but t = 1, the present value of the revenues discounted
8back to t = 1 is given by
V1 = P1
∞∑
i=0
1
(1 + ρ)i
=
(1 + ρ)
ρ
P1.
Similarly, the agent will not invest if V1 is less than I and therefore, his payoff is
given by F1 = max {V1 − I, 0}. However, from the perspective of t = 0, the value
of the project at t = 1 is stochastic, which leads V1 to be stochastic as well. To
determine whether it is worth investing at t = 0, the expectation of F1 is taken
subject to all information available at t = 0, which is given by
E {F1} = pmax
{
(1 + ρ) (1 + u)P0
ρ
− I, 0
}
+(1− p)max
{
(1 + ρ) (1− d)P0
ρ
− I, 0
}
.
E {F} is called the expected continuation value, or continuation value. Since the
agent tries to maximize his payoff, the optimal decision can be made by comparing
max {V0 − I, 0} with E{F1}1+ρ and his payoff is defined by
F0 = max
{
V0 − I, E {F1}
1 + ρ
}
.
In the two-period case, the agent could determine whether he should invest in
the project at t = 0. If he decides not to invest at t = 0, then he has to wait until
t = 1. In other words, his control, ut at each t, can be represented by ut = 0 for
waiting and ut = 1 for investing. This analysis can be extended for the case where
the number of time periods is more than two. A more general situation can also
be considered where the control that the agent has could be a continuous variable,
for example, the amount of investment. It is assumed that there exists some states
which are given by Markov processes; the definition of a Markov process is given
below:
9Definition 1. (Markov process.) A random process xt is called a Markov process
if it satisfies the Markov property, i.e., the conditional probability distribution of
future states xt of the process, given the history of the process up to and including
time s, is dependent only on the state process xs and independent of states before
time s.
Definition 1 indicates that, to predict what will happen at t + 1, the information
needed is given at t, not before t. Since the goal is to consider the uncertainty
determined by a Wiener process and Wiener processes satisfy the Markov property,
it is appropriate to give the assumption that states are Markov processes. It should
first be considered that T is the terminal time, which is finite, and the termination
payoff for the agent is defined by ΩT (xT ), where xt is the vector of states. Suppose
that the current date is t and the agent has already chosen his control ut, which
leads him to immediately obtain profit flow pi(xt, ut). On the other hand, the state
at t + 1 is influenced by ut and xt. Therefore, the continuation value is given by
Et {Ft+1(xt+1)}. Hence, to maximize the payoff at t, it is necessary to solve
Ft(xt) = max
ut
{
pi(xt, ut) +
Et {Ft+1(xt+1)}
1− ρ
}
. (1.1)
Equation (1.1) is called the Bellman equation, which is named after its discoverer,
Richard Bellman. In contrast with the two-period example, immediate investment
implies that pi(x0, 1) = V0−I, while the agent gets only discount continuation value
if he decides to wait, i.e., pi (x0, 0) = 0. This can be regarded as a special case of
equation (1). In order to derive the optimal control at each period, it is possible to
take advantage of the termination payoff ΩT (xT ) and apply the backward method.
10
Since ΩT (xT ) is known, it can be seen that the payoff at t− 1,
FT−1(xT−1) = max
uT−1
{
pi(xT−1, uT−1) +
ET−1 {FT (xT )}
1− ρ
}
= max
uT−1
{
pi(xT−1, uT−1) +
ET−1 {ΩT (xT )}
1− ρ
}
can be computed and therefore, the payoff at each t can be derived. However, in the
case where T is infinite, the backward method collapses because there is no terminal
time. This case can be solved by using a method similar to a two-period model.
The stages at t and t + 1 are considered and the idea discussed above is applied.
On the other hand, if the state x follows a difference equation which is independent
of t explicitly and the profit flow pi (x, u) is also independent on t explicitly, the
model is said to be autonomous; in other words, it is time homogeneous. Therefore,
equation (1.1) can be written as
F (x) = max
u
{
pi(x, u) +
E {F (x′) |x, u}
1− ρ
}
, (1.2)
where x is the current state and x′ is the future state. The expectationE {F (x′) |x, u}
is a conditional expectation where the information is given by the current state x
and control u. Such an assumption always appears in the case of infinite time
horizon models and it is reasonable that, in this case, one makes decisions based
on the state, not the time. Numerically, to find the optimal control, first take any
guess F 1(x) and find the corresponding u1, which is a function of x. Substituting
this into equation (1.2), give another function, say F 2(x). Repeating this procedure
generates a sequence of functions, {F 1(x), F 2(x), ..., F i(x), ...}. It can be shown
that this sequence is convergent and the proof of this can be found in [?], Chapters
4 and 9.
11
So far, this analysis is only valid for a discrete model. The goal of this analysis
is to consider the situation where the model is continuous and uncertainty is given
by some Wiener processes. Therefore, it is necessary to extend the discussion to
continuous time. Supposing that the length of each period is ∆t instead of 1. The
rate for profit flow pi(t, x, u) over each interval of time is defined by pi(t, x, u)∆t and
the discount continuation value is given by E{F (t+∆t,x
′)|x,u}
1+ρ∆t
. Therefore, equation
(1.2) becomes
F (t, x) = max
u
{
pi(t, x, u)∆t+
E {F (t+∆t, x′) |x, u}
1 + ρ∆t
}
,
which then implies
F (t, x) (1 + ρ∆t) = max
u
{pi(t, x, u)∆t (1 + ρ∆t) + E {F (t+∆t, x′) |x, u}} ,
or
ρ∆tF (t, x) = max
u
{pi(t, x, u)∆t (1 + ρ∆t) + E {F (t+∆t, x′)− F (t, x) |x, u}}
= max
u
{pi(t, x, u)∆t (1 + ρ∆t) + E {∆F}} .
Divide both sides in the above equation by ∆t and let ∆t tend to 0, then
ρF (t, x) = max
u
{
pi(t, x, u) +
E {dF}
dt
}
. (1.3)
Now, assuming that the value of the financial project is given by a stochastic
differential equation:
dx(t) = a(t, x, u)dt+ b(t, x, u)dW (t),
12
where W (t) is a Wiener process. Application of Itoˆ formula gives:
dF (t, x(t)) =
(
∂
∂t
F (t, x(t)) + a(t, x(t), u(t))
∂
∂x
F (t, x(t)) +
b2(t, x(t), u(t))
2
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x(t))
)
dt
+b(t, x(t), u(t))
∂
∂x
F (t, x(t))dW (t).
Since E
{
b(t, x(t), u(t)) ∂
∂x
F (t, x(t))dW (t)
}
= 0, E{dF}
dt
, can be represented by
E {dF}
dt
=
∂
∂t
F (t, x(t))+a(t, x(t), u(t))
∂
∂x
F (t, x(t))+
b2(t, x(t), u(t))
2
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x(t)),
and the Bellman equation is defined by
ρF (t, x) = max
u
{
pi(t, x, u) +
∂
∂t
F (t, x) + a(t, x, u)
∂
∂x
F (t, x) +
b2(t, x, u)
2
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x)
}
.
(1.4)
Therefore, the Bellman equation is already derived for the case where the project
value given by an Itoˆ process.
Suppose that the agent can determine whether he should invest at t. If the
investment is irreversible, then this raises a question, i.e., what is the optimal timing
for investing? This is called optimal stopping time. In a two-period model, the
optimal stopping is determined by F0 = max
{
V0 − I, E{F1}1+ρ
}
. If F0 = V0 − I, then
this means that the agent invests at t = 0. On the other hand, if F0 =
E{F1}
1+ρ
, then
he waits until t = 1 and then invests. It can be extended to a model with many
periods. If the termination payoff is defined by Ω(t, x), then the Bellman equation
becomes
F (t, x) = max
{
Ω(t, x), pi(t, x) +
E {F (t+∆t, x′) |t, x}
1 + ρ
}
. (1.5)
Similarly, the agent would not invest if F (t, x) = pi(t, x) + E{F (t+∆t,x
′)|t,x}
1+r
. Now,
13
moving to the case where the financial project is defined by an Itoˆ process. Equation
(1.4) implies that
ρF (t, x) = pi(t, x) +
∂
∂t
F (t, x) + a(t, x)
∂
∂x
F (t, x) +
b2(t, x)
2
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x). (1.6)
To determine the optimal stopping, note that, in a discrete case, the termination
payoff and expected continuation value are compared. In a continuous model, it is
reasonable that the optimal stopping satisfies the condition F (t, x∗(t)) = Ω(t, x∗(t)),
which is called the value-matching condition. Moreover, this is a free-boundary
problem because x∗ is unknown. Mathematically, this is always more complicated
than an initial value problem. On the other hand, there is an additional condition
which comes from economic consideration and this is defined by ∂
∂x
F (t, x∗) =
∂
∂x
Ω(t, x∗). This condition is named the smooth-pasting condition. The value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions do indeed give the optimal stopping. The
value-matching condition requires that at the time the agent invests, the payoff and
the continuation value subtracting the sunk cost are equal. On the other hand,
the smooth-pasting condition guarantees the continuity of the first derivative at x∗.
To see how both conditions work, an example can be found in [?], see page 130,
Appendix C. On the other hand, if the time horizon is infinity, and pi(x), a(x), b(x)
and Ω(x) are not explicitly dependent on time, then the equation for the model is
autonomous and equation (1.6) can be rewritten as
ρF (x) = pi(x) + a(x)F ′(x) +
b2(x)
2
F ′′(x). (1.7)
with two conditions, F (x∗) = Ω(x∗) and F ′(x∗) = Ω′(x∗). Comparing equation (1.6)
with (1.7), it can be seen that, in the case with a finite time horizon, the optimal
stopping is not only dependent on time, but also the state, which is the value of
14
the project. In the case where the time horizon is infinite, the agent chooses the
optimal stopping according to the state x. This is realistic because he can wait until
the continuation value reaches the termination payoff without facing any terminal
date.
This section now moves on to another technique, named contingent claims anal-
ysis. In dynamic programming, F (t, x) is interpreted as the value of an asset in the
market, while in contingent claim analysis, F (t, x) could be regarded as the output
of a firm, e.g., oil and copper production. This can be traded as an asset in financial
markets. The discount rate ρ in dynamic programming is given exogenously, and
this may not be easy to specify. On the other hand, in contingent claims analysis, it
is assumed that the traded asset has a risk adjusted expected rate of return µ and
therefore the firm pays a risk premium of µ−r, where r is the riskless rate of return
given exogenously. Suppose that the financial project x(t) follows the stochastic
differential equation
dx(t) = α(t, x(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t),
where W (t) is a standard Wiener process. The expected rate of return of the
investment is given by α(t,x(t))
x(t)
and for arbitrage reasons it would need to pay a
dividend rate of
δ(t, x(t)) = µ− α(t, x(t))
x(t)
.
In the context of real options this rate is called the implied proportional dividend
rate. Suppose that an agent invests one dollar and buys n units of x. The agent
holds this for an interval of time dt and obtains rdt from the riskless asset. On
the other hand, the other asset pays a dividend nδ(t, x(t))x(t)dt and has a random
capital gain, ndx(t) = nα(t, x(t))dt+ nσ(t, x(t))dW (t). Therefore, the total return
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on each dollar invested is
r + n (α(t, x(t)) + δ(t, x(t))x(t))
1 + nx(t)
dt+
nσ(t, x(t))
1 + nx(t)
dW (t).
On the other side, if the output of the firm is given by F (t, x(t)) and the profit flow
is defined by pi(t, x(t)), according to the Itoˆ’s formula:
dF (t, x(t)) =
(
∂
∂t
F (t, x(t)) + α(t, x(t))
∂
∂x
F (t, x(t)) +
σ2(t, x(t))
2
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x(t))
)
dt
+σ(t, x(t))
∂
∂x
F (t, x(t))dW (t).
If the portfolio can replicate the risk of owning the firm, this gives the following
equations:
pi(t, x) + ∂
∂t
F (t, x) + α(t, x) ∂
∂x
F (t, x) + σ
2(t,x)
2
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x)
F (t, x)
=
r + n (α(t, x) + δ(t, x)x)
1 + nx
,
σ(t, x) ∂
∂x
F (t, x)
F (t, x)
=
nσ(t, x)
1 + nx
Therefore,
σ2(t, x)
2
∂2
∂x2
F (t, x) + (r − δ(t, x))x ∂
∂x
F (t, x) +
∂
∂t
F (t, x)− rF (t, x) + pi(t, x) = 0,
(1.8)
with the conditions F (t, x∗) = Ω(t, x∗) and ∂
∂x
F (t, x∗) = ∂
∂x
Ω(t, x∗). Note that if
the model is autonomous, equation (1.8) becomes:
σ2(x)
2
F ′′(x) + (r − δ(x))xF ′(x)− rF (x) + pi(x) = 0. (1.9)
with the conditions F (x∗) = Ω(x∗) and F ′(x∗) = Ω′(x∗).
It can be seen that equations (1.6) and (1.8) are of a similar structure, r replaces
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ρ and (r − δ(t, x))x replaces a(t, x). The interpretation of the contingent claims
analysis differs from that in dynamic programming: In dynamic programming, the
agent determines whether the asset is worth holding, while in contingent claims
analysis, the agent chooses the option exercise date in order to maximize the value
of the asset. When working with dynamic programming, a discount rate is required,
thus ρ is given exogenously, while in contingent claim analysis, the riskless rate of
return r is needed and this is easy to specify compared to ρ. However, in contingent
claim analysis, a rich set of markets in risky assets is necessary because the intension
is to replicate the uncertainty W (t) by some risky assets in markets.
1.2. Stochastic differential games
Differential game theory was introduced by Rufus Isaacs in 1965, see [?]. In
classical game theory, players are allowed to make decisions at a particular time.
However, in the real world, time is continuous and this assumption may not be
realistic. Differential game theory differs from classical game theory in some aspects:
All players face a continuous time horizon and they are allowed to make their
decisions at any time. Each player tries to maximize his objective functional, which
can be interpreted as the payoff. Moreover, payoffs are accumulated over time. All
players face a family of states defined by differential equations. The interpretation
of these states is dependent on the problem that is being dealt with. For example,
in a public good game, the state is interpreted as the value of the public good,
whereas in a fishery game, states are understood to be the biomass of species.
These cases will be introduced in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. The techniques
that are applied to deal with differential games are the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation and Pontryagin’s maximum principle. A deterministic differential game
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model is always given, for each player i,
max
ui
∫ T
t0
e−ri(t−t0)Fi(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t))dt+ e−r(T−t0)Si(x(T )), (1.10)
subject to
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t))dt, x(t0) = x0, (1.11)
where
u−i(t) = (u1t, ..., ui−1(t), ui+1(t), ..., uN(t))
is the strategies chosen by other players. ui is the vector of controls for player
i and ri is a discount rate. Si(x) is called the transversality condition, which is
interpreted as the terminal payoffs of player i. To solve the system (1.10) and
(1.11), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and Pontryagin’s maximum principle
are introduced. There are defined below:
Theorem 1. (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.) Let V : X × [0, T ] → < be a
continuously differential function, where X is the state space. If V (t, x) satisfies the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
rV (t, x)− ∂
∂t
V (t, x) = max
u
{
F (t, x, u) +
∂
∂x
V (t, x)f(t, x, u)
}
,
with the terminal condition V (T, x) = S(x), then u∗ maximizing the right hand side
of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is an optimal control and V (t, x) is the
optimal value.
where ∂
∂x
V (t, x) is denoted by the gradient of V (t, x) with respect to x, and
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Theorem 2. (Pontryagin’s maximum principle.) Let
H(t, x(t), λ(t), u(t)) = F (t, x(t), u(t)) + λ(t)f(t, x(t), u(t))
be the Hamiltonian function and suppose that
H∗(t, x(t), λ(t)) = max
u
{H(t, x(t), λ(t), u(t))}
exists. Assume that X, the state space, is convex and the transversality condition
S(x) ∈ C1, where C1 is the class of all continuously differentiable functions, is con-
vex. If there exists an absolutely continuous function λ(t) satisfying H∗(t, x(t), λ(t)) =
maxu {H(t, x(t), λ(t), u(t))}, the costate equation λ′(t) = rλ(t)− ∂∂xH∗(t, x(t), λ(t))
and λ(T ) = S ′(x(T )) as well as H∗(t, x, λ(t)) ∈ C1 is concave with respect to x,
then u∗ which maximizes the Hamiltonian function is an optimal control.
Theorem 1 and 2 are versions of a finite time horizon, and to solve a deterministic
differential game model, Theorem 1 or 2 are applied to derive the value function
Vi(t, x) for each player i and then solve a system of partial differential equations.
Each partial differential equation has an associated boundary condition Vi(T, x) =
Si(x). However, in the real world, some situations may be faced where the terminal
time is unknown or the time duration is infinity, i.e., T = ∞. In this case, the
transversality condition is usually given by Si(x) = 0 because there is no terminal
date and terminal payoff. Theorem 1 and 2 can be extended to versions capable
of resolving infinite time horizon. The idea is to give a finite terminal time T
and then derive u∗ and V (t, x;T ). If limT→∞ V (t, x;T ) exists and this solves the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the infinite time horizon model, then V (t, x)
is the optimal value function. This idea is called the finite horizon approximation
approach, which is mentioned in [?], see page 70. The finite horizon approximation
19
approach is used because, with an infinite time horizon, the terminal condition for
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is given by limT→∞ V (T, x;T ) = 0, which is
not helpful when solving the partial differential equation of V (t, x). On the other
hand, it is possible to guess the form of solutions and then derive the unknown
coefficients. However, it may not be easy to pick the correct values. One example
of this is given in the paper by Ewald and Wang (2009), see [?]. This is based
on a stochastic model, where it can easily be supposed that the volatility is 0.
Moreover, the solution, derived by finite horizon approximation approach, satisfies
the catching-up optimality, i.e.,
lim inf
T→∞
V (t, u∗(t);T )− V (t, u(t);T ) ≥ 0,
where u∗ is an optimal control for the finite horizon model with terminal time T
and u is any feasible control. Let [0, T 〉 be denoted by the time duration that
players face. There are three types of Nash-equilibrium strategies: open-loop Nash-
equilibrium strategies, feedback Nash-equilibrium strategies and stationary feed-
back Nash-equilibrium strategies. Feedback Nash-equilibrium strategies are some-
times called closed-loop Nash-equilibrium strategies or Markovian Nash-equilibrium
strategies. Each type has its own interpretation. These are the definitions for each
type:
Definition 2. (Open-loop Nash equilibrium.) The N-tuple (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N ) of functions
, u∗i : [0, T 〉 → <mi , is called an open-loop Nash equilibrium if u∗i solves the system
(1.10) and (1.11) and it is a function of time.
Definition 3. (Feedback Nash equilibrium.) The N-tuple (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N ) of functions
, u∗i : X × [0, T 〉 → <mi where X is the state space, is called a feedback Nash
equilibrium if u∗i solves the system (1.8) and (1.9) and is a function of both time
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and states.
Definition 4. (Stationary feedback Nash equilibrium.) The N-tuple (u∗1, ..., u
∗
N ) of
functions , u∗i : X → <mi , is called a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium if u∗i
solves the system (1.8) and (1.9) and it is a function of states.
Definition 2 says that an open-loop Nash-equilibrium strategy is dependent on time.
It always appears in a finite time horizon model because each player knows the
terminal time and time definitely affects their strategies. For example, in a public
good game, due to the free rider effect, it is intuitive that each player has less
incentives to invest until the terminal date is approaching. On the other hand, when
a player decides to employ a feedback Nash-equilibrium strategy, he is concerned not
only with current time, but also current states. This could be used in a situation
where some players know that the states they are currently facing may not be
correct. Because all players derive their optimal strategies from the states, those
players who realise this can take advantage of the correct current states and then
make their decisions. Definition 4 always occurs when players are facing an infinite
time horizon. Mathematically, if the model is autonomous, one could derive a
stationary feedback Nash-equilibrium strategy if such a strategy exists. In the case
with an infinite time horizon, open-loop Nash equilibria and stationary feedback
Nash equilibria represent different phenomena. Taking the deterministic public
good game in [?], section 9.5, as an example: If players decide to employ open-loop
Nash equilibrium strategies, because there is no terminal date, it can be seen that
the open-loop Nash equilibrium is convergent to a constant. This implies that the
players have an expectation of what value the good will converge to. However, this
ignores an important phenomenon, the free ride effect. On the other hand, when
considering a stationary feedback Nash-equilibrium strategy, it can be seen that the
free rider effect will appear. A larger value of the public good leads players to have
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less incentive to invest because they will try to free ride on others. The case of the
stochastic version will be introduced in Chapter 2.
It can be seen that, uncertainty always plays an important role in the real
world. The introduction above only examines a deterministic model. One idea
that could extend a deterministic differential game to a stochastic differential game
is to consider that the uncertainty is determined by a Wiener process. In this case,
the stochastic differential game is defined, for each player i,
max
ui
E
{∫ T
t0
e−ri(t−t0)Fi(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i)dt+ e−r(T−t0)Si(x(T ))
}
, (1.12)
subject to
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t))dW (t), x(t0) = x0, (1.13)
where σ(t, x(t), ui(t), u−i(t)) is a matrix of functions and W (t) is a vector of some
independent Wiener processes. It can be seen that in equation (1.12), players
maximize their expected utility since they face uncertainty. In contrast with a
deterministic differential game, in a stochastic differential game, there are still three
types of Nash-equilibrium strategies. However, the concept of open-loop Nash-
equilibrium strategies may not be appropriate when facing a stochastic model. The
reason for this is that uncertainty now appears in the model and it is harder to
react by only considering time. Therefore, a feedback Nash-equilibrium strategy
is always employed in a stochastic differential game. Another difference can be
seen in the techniques used to solve a model. In a deterministic differential game,
there are two methods, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and Pontryagin’s
maximum principle, used to solve a model. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to
apply Pontryagin’s maximum principle to deal with a stochastic differential game,
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and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is widely used when facing a stochastic
differential game. The stochastic version of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
is given by
Theorem 3. (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.) Let V : X × [0, T ] → < be a
function and ∂
∂t
V (t, x), ∂
∂x
V (t, x) and ∂
2
∂x2
V (t, x) are continuous. If V (t, x) satisfies
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
rV (t, x)− ∂
∂t
V (t, x)
= max
u
{
F (t, x, u) +
∂
∂x
V (t, x)f(t, x, u) +
1
2
tr
(
∂2
∂x2
V (t, x)σ(t, x, u)σ(t, x, u)′
)}
,
where σ(t, x, u) is the matrix of volatility and σ(t, x, u)′ is the transpose of σ(t, x, u),
then u∗ maximizing the right hand side of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is
an optimal control and V (t, x) is the expected optimal value.
Similarly to Theorem 1, Theorem 3 can be extended to the case with T = ∞.
The concept is analogous to the deterministic version. In the deterministic version,
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is given by a first order partial differential
equation, while in the stochastic version, it is defined by a second order differential
equation. The reason is due to Itoˆ’s formula and it can be seen that the volatility
appears only in the coefficient for the term ∂
2
∂x2
V (t, x). The proofs for Theorem 1,
2 and 3 can be referred to [?] and they have been omitted here.
Chapter 2
Dynamic voluntary provision of
public goods with uncertainty
Various papers have discussed the free rider problem within a static game theoretic
model. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) [?] considered this case and proved
that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium under very weak assumptions. Various
other studies have considered the static case, see [?], [?], [?], [?] and [?]. In many
contexts however a dynamic model where agents can adjust their provisions toward
a public good depending on the current state of the system appears to be more
reasonable and is therefore worthy of investigation. McMillan (1979) studied an
infinitely repeated game and showed that the free rider problem may not be apparent
if the value of public goods are not discounted too heavily, see [?]. McMillan’s setup
differs slightly from the line taken in many other studies in the way that he uses
trigger strategies instead of continuous adjustment of the provision rate. However
within this setup he does establish that the non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium is
Pareto optimal, which is a remarkable result. This chapter will follow the approach
taken by Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) who presented a continuous time model
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with infinite time horizon with no uncertainty [?]. These authors suppose that the
benefits and costs are accumulated over time and derived feedback Nash equilibria.
In many applications of public good theory, uncertainty plays a fundamental
role, for example, with insurance. For this reason the setup of Fershtman and
Nitzan has been extend to include an uncertainty term. Two different cases will be
studied: in the first one the volatility of the uncertainty term depends exclusively
on the current level of the public good. In this case the form of the feedback
Nash-equilibrium is identical to the deterministic case. The level of the public good
however fluctuates randomly. In the second case, the volatility of the uncertainty
is dependent on the current rate of public good provision by the agents. This
case results in a qualitatively different result. From an economic viewpoint, both
scenarios are realistic. A large project value is associated with a higher risk. On
the other hand, if an investor invests a great amount of money in a short amount
of time, the level of the public good is generally also exposed to higher uncertainty.
In reality there will be a mixture of both effects, but in this chapter they will be
strictly separated for reasons of tractability and in order to highlight the differences.
This chapter will concentrate on the symmetric framework and the objective is
to compute a symmetric feedback Nash-equilibrium in the sense of a stationary
Markovian Nash equilibrium, which has been defined in section 1.2, Definition 4.
The following section, 2.1, will give a brief introduction to the deterministic model
that was studied by Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) [?]. This model will be extended
by the introduction of a general uncertainty term in section 2.2. Section 2.3 will
focus on the case where the volatility of the uncertainty exclusively depends on
the current level of the public good, while section 2.4 examines, the case where it
exclusively depends on the rate of contribution to the public good. Cooperative
and non cooperative cases will be compared in both section 2.3 and 2.4. Various
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numerical results are discussed in section 2.3 and 2.4, as well as presented in the
form of figures in the end of this chapter. Some conclusions are made in section 2.5.
2.1. The deterministic model
This section will start with, a brief introduction of the deterministic model studied
by Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) [?]. Here, the project value is given by the following
controlled differential equation
x′(t) =
n∑
i=1
ui(t)− δx(t), x(0) = x0. (2.1)
the parameter δ is called a depreciation rate. It is assumed to be non-negative. The
control ui(t) represents the amount of money invested into the project by investor
i, while n is the number of investors. It would be expected that a higher value
of depreciation rate would lead to a lower value of both the project and utility.
Furthermore, investors may have less incentive to invest under a large depreciation
rate. Each agent faces an individual cost given by C(ui(t)) but they all benefit from
the project in the same way. More precisely the benefit for each agent is given by
αf(x(t)), where α is greater than 0 and less than 1. Fershtman and Nitzan called
the project a pure public good if α = 1, otherwise it represents a combination of
public and private good. Mathematically however, α does not play an important
role here, since it can be assumed that f˜(x(t)) = αf(x(t)) and replacement of f˜
with f leads to α = 1. Therefore, it is only necessary to concentrate on the case of
α = 1. For each agent i, the objective functional is defined by
max
ui
∫ ∞
0
e−rt[f(x(t))− C(ui(t))]dt (2.2)
26
subject to equation (2.1), where r is a discount rate. In order to obtain a mathe-
matically tractable model Fershtman and Nitzan proposed that the cost for investor
i is given by C(ui) =
u2i
2
, and that the project value at t is given by f(x) = ax−bx2,
where x < a
2b
, which therefore leads the model to be a linear quadratic game, see
[?], Chapter 7. Note that under (2.1), the condition, x < a
2b
, will always hold,
providing that each investor chooses to invest according to the unique open loop
Nash equilibrium. If the assumption x < a
2b
is relaxed, this can instead be thought
of as a public good that satisfies the property that one suffers from it if its value
is too large. One example indicated earlier in Chapter 1 is the over development
of an environmental resource. To solve this model, Fershtman and Nitzan apply
the Pontryagin maximum principle. As the model developed in this thesis includes
uncertainty in the form of diffusion terms, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman approach
will be used. The following analysis will concentrate on the case of two investors,
because simplifies the notation. The general case can be treated in analogy. As
the focus will be on a symmetric Nash-equilibrium, the value function for both
agents will be the same and Vi(x) will be written as V (x). Note that this model is
autonomous and hence, according to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, if u∗j is
a stationary Nash feedback optimal control for agent j, this will give the differential
equation
rV (x) = max
ui
{
−u
2
i
2
+
(
ax− bx2)+ V ′(x) (ui + u∗j − δx)
}
(2.3)
A necessary condition to maximize equation (2.3) is u∗i = V
′(x), the marginal benefit
of the value function. Substituting this into equation (2.3), shows that the value
function is the solution of the ordinary differential equation:
3
2
[V ′(x)]2 − δxV ′(x)− rV (x)− bx2 + ax = 0 (2.4)
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When considering the infinite horizon case, there is no terminal condition for the
differential equation. Without further specification, there are an infinite number of
solutions to equation (2.4). Instead of employing transversality conditions, which
are more suitable for the Pontryagin maximum principle approach, this analysis
will employ the technique of finite horizon approximation approach. If a sufficiently
large expiry time T is given, the terminal condition is given by V (T, x;T ) = 0 and
this implies
lim
T→∞
V (T, x;T ) = 0. (2.5)
Assuming a functional form V (t, x;T ) = A(t;T )x2 + B(t;T )x + C(t;T ), equa-
tion (2.4) can be solved with respect to the terminal condition V (T, x;T ) = 0.
Substitution into the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation produces three differential
equations for A(t;T ), B(t;T ) and C(t;T ). These are given by
A′(t;T ) = −6A2(t;T ) + (r + 2δ)A(t;T ) + b, A(T ;T ) = 0
B′(t;T ) = (r + δ − 6A(t;T ))B(t;T )− 1, B(T ;T ) = 0
C ′(t;T ) = rC(t;T )− 3
2
B2(t;T ), C(T ;T ) = 0
Their fixed points can be computed as A = A±, Bc = ar−6A+δ and Cc =
3B2
2r
,
where A± = (r+δ)±
√
(r+δ)2+24b
12
. Since equation (2.5) holds, by analyzing the (A,A′)-
diagram, it can be seen that A(t) must lie in [A−, 0] and its limit is Ac = A−
for T tending to infinity. Therefore, the corresponding value function is given by
V (x) = Acx
2 + Bcx + Cc and the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium can be
computed as u∗i = 2Acx+Bc. The corresponding state equation is then given by
x′(t) = (4Ac − δ)x(t) + 2Bc, x(0) = x0 (2.6)
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The solution can be computed and the limit is given by x = 2Bc
δ−4Ac as T tends to
infinity. Note that a larger value of δ indeed implies a lower project value and lower
optimal utility. On the other hand, the open-loop Nash-equilibrium strategy
4AcBc
δ − 4Ac −
2Ac
δ − 4Ac (2Bc + 4Ac − δ) e
(4Ac−δ)t +Bc,
tends to 4AcBc
δ−4Ac + Bc > 0 for t tending to infinity. As indicated in Chapter 1, it is
harder to observe the free ride effect if agents adopt the open-loop Nash-equilibrium
strategies and this is one disadvantage when studying a public good game model.
2.2. A stochastic version of the Fershtman and Nitzan model
The analysis in this section will extend the model discussed previously section by
introducing uncertainty in the form of diffusion terms. This is one step toward a
more realistic model, because in the real world agents face uncertainty. To construct
the model, without loss of generality, it is supposed that there are only two agents
and equation (2.1) can be extended to:
dx(t) = [u1(t) + u2(t)− δx(t)] dt+ σ(u1(t), u2(t), x(t))dW (t), x(0) = x0, (2.7)
where W (t) is a Wiener process. The volatility σ(u1(t), u2(t), x(t)) determines the
level of uncertainty. The objective of agent i is given by
max
ui
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rt [f(x(t))− C(ui(t))] dt |x(0) = x0
}
(2.8)
subject to equation (2.7). It is still assumed that individual costs are given by
C(ui) =
u2i
2
and benefit functions are determined by f(x) = ax− bx2, exactly as in
Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) [?]. Note that this model is time homogeneous. To
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solve it, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the model is derived as
rV (x) (2.9)
= max
ui
{
−u
2
i
2
+ ax− bx2 + ∂
∂x
V (x)
(
ui + u
∗
j − δx
)
+
σ2((u1, u2, x))
2
∂2
∂x2
V (x)
}
,
where u∗j is the optimal control for investor j. As before, interest is in a symmetric
Nash-equilibrium and it can therefore be assumed that u∗1 = u
∗
2. Equation (2.9)
then enables the optimal control for agent i to be computed via
u∗i (x) =
∂
∂x
V (x) + σ((t, u1, u2, x))
∂
∂ui
σ((u1, u2, x))
∂2
∂x2
V (x). (2.10)
From equation (2.10) it can be seen that, if the volatility function σ((u1(t), u2(t), x(t))
does not explicitly depend on the controls, the optimal control in (2.10) is given by
u∗i (x) = V
′(x). This is formally the same as in the deterministic case, i.e. investment
occurs according to marginal benefits from the public good. Note, however, that
the value function changes due to the second order term in (2.9). As in the previous
chapter, the technique of finite horizon approximation approach is applied to solve
(2.9). In the general case where no analytical solution can be found, it is necessary
to rely on numerical techniques so it is important to choose a sufficiently large T
and then solve equation (3.9) with a suitable algorithm for a two dimensional partial
differential equation, for example, the implicit method and Crank-Nicholson. Once
a solution is obtained, all V (t, x;T ) terms can be examined by using the inequality:
∣∣∣∣∣rV (t, x;T ) + (u
∗
i )
2
2
− ax+ bx2 − V ′(t, x;T ) (u∗i + u∗j − δx)− σ2(u∗i , u∗j , x)2 V ′′(t, x;T )
∣∣∣∣∣ < ,
(2.11)
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for all sufficiently large t and a given sufficiently small . Inequality (2.11) is
equivalent to ∣∣∣∣ ∂∂tV (t, x;T )
∣∣∣∣ < ′
for sufficiently small ′. However, equation (2.9) is simulated only under a small
interval of state x instead of a large one. The idea is that it is only necessary to have
an initial condition and then algorithms for ordinary differential equations can be
applied, for example, the Runge-Kutta method, to solve equation (2.9) numerically.
Since equation (2.9) is only a second order ordinary differential equation, this will
be more efficient than solving a partial differential equation. On the other hand,
equation (2.9) can be solved numerically by the Markov chain approach, which was
introduced in [?]. The concept used is to discretise (2.9) by the finite difference
method and then determine the so called transition probabilities, which represent
how the current state x changes. Such problems can be solved by functional
iteration. However, one disadvantage is that it may not be possible to find out
the functional form in each iteration.
2.3. The case where volatility depends on the level of the public good
This section will present specific results for the case where σ(ui, uj, x) is inde-
pendent of the contribution rates and linearly dependent on the level of public
good. The motivation for this specification is that a larger project value generally
fluctuates more significantly than a smaller one. More precisely, it can be assumed
that:
σ(ui, uj, x) = σx.
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Equation (2.10) provides the Nash-optimal control u∗i (x) = V
′(x). The Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation is given by
σ2x2
2
V ′′(x) +
3
2
[V ′(x)]2 − δxV ′(x)− rV (x)− bx2 + ax = 0 (2.12)
The finite horizon approximation approach leads to the solution, Ax2 + Bx + C,
where A, B and C are fixed points of the following differential equations
A′(t;T ) = −6A2(t) + (r + 2δ − σ2)A(t) + b
B′(t;T ) = (r + δ − 6A(t))B(t)− a
C ′(t;T ) = rC(t)− 3
2
B2(t)
It can be shown that A± = (
r+2δ−σ2)±
√
(r+2δ−σ2)2+24b
12
, B = a
r−6A±+δ and C =
3a2
2r(r−6A±+δ)2 are solutions of the fixed point equation for the system above. An
analysis of the (A,A′)-diagram and the transversality condition for a finite time
horizon model with a terminal time T shows that A(t;T ) should lie in the interval
[A−, 0]. Therefore, as T tends to infinity, A(t;T ) converges to Ap = A−. With the
notation
Ap =
(r + 2δ − σ2)−
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 24b
12
< 0
Bp =
a
r − 6Ap + δ > 0
Cp =
3a2
2r (r − 6Ap + δ)2
> 0
the value function for this problem is given by:
V (x) = Apx
2 +Bpx+ Cp
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and the Nash-equilibrium strategy is:
u∗i (x) = 2Apx+Bp.
Note that the Nash-equilibrium strategy is negative when x is sufficiently large.
In this case, agents could stop investing until x has reduced. Under the Nash-
equilibrium controls, state x follows the linear stochastic differential equation:
dx(t) = (4Apx(t) + 2Bp − δx(t)) dt+ σx(t)dW (t), x(0) = x0 (2.13)
Note that the process defined by (2.13) always remains positive, since
dx(t) = 2Bpdt, if x(t) = 0
The stochastic differential equation is linear and can be solved analytically. In fact
it follows from Kuo (2000) section 11.1 in [?] that equation (2.13) has the solution
x(t) = x0e
(
4Ap−δ−σ2
2
)
t+σW (t)
+
∫ t
0
2Bpe
(
4Ap−δ−σ2
2
)
(t−s)+σ(W (t)−W (s))
ds. (2.14)
Taking expectations gives
E {x(t)} = E
{
x0e
(
4Ap−δ−σ2
2
)
t+σW (t)
}
+E
{∫ t
0
2Bpe
(
4Ap−δ−σ2
2
)
(t−s)+σ(W (t)−W (s))
ds
}
Using the fact that the expectation of a geometric Brownian motion is known and
interchanging expectation and integration within the second integral, the following
is obtained
E
{
x0e
(
4Ap−δ−σ2
2
)
t+σW (t)
}
= x0e
(4Ap−δ)t
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and
E
{∫ t
0
2Bpe
(
4Ap−δ−σ2
2
)
(t−s)+σ(W (t)−W (s))
ds
}
=
2Bp
δ − 4Ap
(
1− e(4Ap−δ)t) .
Therefore,
lim
t→∞
E {x(t)} = 2Bp
δ − 4Ap (2.15)
Note that, in this case, the expected level of the public good converges to its
deterministic analogue. Also note however that Ap and Bp are both dependent
on σ and therefore uncertainty has an effect. The slope coefficient in the Nash-
equilibrium control u∗i (X) = 2ApX + Bp is negative. In the case of a deterministic
game model, Fershtman and Nitzan have given an economic interpretation in [?].
The interpretation in the case presented here is basically the same. Once a large
value of the project is observed, individuals may try to free ride on other agents,
and this leads to a decreasing contribution rate. Now, considering the equilibrium
distribution of x(t), i.e.,
lim
t→∞
x(t).
If the density function of the equilibrium distribution of x(t) exists, it will satisfy
the Kolmogorov forward equation and is given by the solution for the differential
equation
σ2x2
2
P ′′(x) +
(
2σ2 + δ − 4Ap
)
xP ′(x)− 2BpP ′(x) +
(
σ2 + δ − 4Ap
)
P (x) = 0,∫ ∞
0
P (x)dx = 1,
where P (x) is the probability density function. Nevertheless, the Kolmogorov
forward equation may not be easily solved due to the condition
∫∞
0
P (x)dx = 1. To
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solve it, it is supposed that
F (y) =
∫ y
0
P (x)dx
Since
∫ y
0
xP ′(x)dx = yF ′(y)− F (y)∫ y
0
x2P ′′(x)dx = y2F ′′(y)− 2yF ′(y) + 2F (y)
the Kolmogorov forward equation is equivalent to
σ2y2
2
F ′′(y) +
(
σ2 + δ − 4Ap
)
yF ′(y)− 2BpF ′(y) = 0
F (0) = 0
lim
y→∞
F (y) = 1
The Kolmogorov forward equation may not be solved analytically; on the other
hand, the transformation leads the Kolmogorov forward equation to be solved
numerically via the shooting method, see [?], section 6.1. The concept of shooting
method is to estimate the first derivate at 0 and therefore a boundary value problem
can be converted to an initial value problem. To solve an initial value problem, the
finite difference method or Runge-Kutta algorithm can be applied. Some results of
sensitivity analysis will be presented. It can be shown that Ap is increasing in δ.
Indeed,
∂Ap
∂δ
=
− (r + 2δ − σ2) +
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 24b
6
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 24b
> 0.
r+2δ−σ2 is assumed to be non negative. This condition is satisfied for all realistic
values of σ and r. Since r−6Ap+δ is increasing, Bp and Cp are decreasing. Therefore,
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since the coefficient Ap is dominant for large x while the coefficients Bp and Cp are
dominant for small x, it can be seen that an increase in the depreciation rate leads
to a lower value of optimal utility for small x and a larger value of optimal utility
for large x. The interpretation of this phenomenon is that within this specification
in the stochastic case, the example represents a case where it is undesirable to have
too large a value of public good. Moreover, since Ap is increasing in δ, the free rider
effect is less apparent if the depreciation rate is higher. On the other hand, Ap is
decreasing in σ. This follows from
∂Ap
∂σ
=
σ
[
(r + 2δ − σ2)−
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 24b
]
6
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 24b
.
Similarly it can be seen that Bp and Cp are decreasing with respect to σ. Thus,
the stationary Nash-equilibrium and optimal utility are decreasing in σ too. It
can be seen from equation (2.15) that the long term expectation is decreasing with
respect to σ, which means that a higher risk reduces the expected value of the
project, which in effect causes agents to have even less incentives to invest money.
Furthermore, a larger σ leads the free rider effect to be more apparent because the
slope of the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium is decreasing in σ. On the other
hand, if both agents are allowed to cooperate, i.e., they do not concentrate on their
individual utility functions but but instead focus on the joint utility function, then
the objective functional is given by
max
u1,u2
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
−u
2
1(t) + u
2
2(t)
2
+ 2
(
ax(t)− bx2(t))] dt |x(0) = x0
}
. (2.16)
36
The finite horizon approximation approach leads the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion to be given by
rV (t, x;T )− ∂
∂t
V (t, x;T )
= max
u1,u2
{
−u
2
1 + u
2
2
2
+ 2
(
ax− bx2)+ ∂
∂x
V (t, x;T ) +
σ2x2
2
∂2
∂x2
V (t, x;T )
}
.
(2.17)
A necessary condition of maximizing equation (2.17) is given by
u∗1 = u
∗
2 =
∂
∂x
V (t, x;T ). (2.18)
Substituting equation (2.18) into equation (2.17), gives
rV (t, x;T )− ∂
∂t
V (t, x;T )
=
σ2x2
2
∂2
∂x2
V (t, x;T ) +
[
∂
∂x
V (t, x;T )
]2
− δx ∂
∂x
V (t, x;T ) +
(
ax− bx2) . (2.19)
The solution for equation (2.19) is defined by the form A(t;T )x2 + B(t;T )x +
C(t;T ). Substituting equation (2.19) into equation (2.18), gives the following
ordinary differential equations
A′(t;T ) = −4A2(t;T ) + (r + 2δ − σ2)A(t;T ) + 2b,
B′(t;T ) = (r + δ − 4A(t;T ))B(t;T )− 2a,
C ′(t;T ) = rC(t;T )−B2(t;T ).
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Next it is necessary to derive the fixed points for the above system. To satisfy
equation (2.5), A(t;T ), B(t;T ) and C(t;T ) are convergent to
Acp =
(r + 2δ − σ2)−
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 32b
8
< 0,
Bcp =
2a
r − 4Acp + δ
> 0,
Ccp =
(
Bcp
)2
r
> 0.
Now comparing the free rider effect for the cooperative case with the non-cooperative
case: as seen above, the free rider effect is affected by the negative slope Ap and A
c
p.
A lower slope leads the free rider effect to be more apparent. Since
Acp − Ap =
(r + 2δ − σ2)−
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 32b
8
−
(r + 2δ − σ2)−
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 24b
12
=
(r + 2δ − σ2)− 3
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 32b+ 2
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 24b
24
≤
(r + 2δ − σ2)−
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 32b
24
≤ 0,
it can be seen that the free rider effect is more apparent under the cooperative
condition. On the other hand, it can be proved that Acp ≤ 32Ap and this implies that
Bcp ≥ 2Bp; indeed,
Bcp − 2Bp =
2a
r − 4Acp + δ
− 2a
r − 6Ap + δ
=
a
[√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 24b−
√
(r + 2δ − σ2)2 + 32b
]
(
r − 4Acp + δ
)
(r − 6Ap + δ)
≤ 0.
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On the other hand, it can be shown that Acp ≥ 2Ap and Ccp ≥ 2Cp. Therefore,
the difference between the joint optimal utility function and the sum of optimal
utility functions,
(
Acp − 2Ap
)
x2 +
(
Bcp − 2Bp
)
x +
(
Ccp − 2Cp
)
, has the minimum
2Bp−Bcp
2(Acp−2Ap)
≤ 0. This therefore implies that agents prefer to compete if
x ∈
[
− (Bcp − 2Bp)−√K
2
(
Acp − 2Ap
) , −
(
Bcp − 2Bp
)
+
√
K
2
(
Acp − 2Ap
)
]
,
when K ≥ 0 is given by
K =
(
Bcp − 2Bp
)2 − 4 (Acp − 2Ap) (Ccp − 2Cp) .
It can be seen that agents prefer to cooperate when x is sufficiently large or low.
When x is large, agents free ride others more obviously under cooperation and this
leads x to decrease significantly. On the other side, a lower x implies a lower risk
and therefore agents cooperate under a lower risk. It can be shown that the limit
of the expectation of x(t) under cooperation is larger than under non-cooperation.
Even though the free rider effect is more apparent when cooperating, the limit of
the expectation of the public good value is larger.
A numerical example of this case is presented. This is based on the assumptions
that r = 0.1, δ = 0.3, σ = 0.2, a = 2 and b = 1. To single out the expectation of the
corresponding state, it is assumed that T = 10 and 20000 trajectories are simulated.
In Figure 2.1, it can be seen that if we fix x = 0, the optimal utility function is
decreasing. On the other hand, if x = 5 is fixed, the optimal utility function is
increasing. In Figure 2.2, for any fixed x, the optimal utility function is decreasing.
In Figure 2.3, it can be seen that the limit is approximately 0.91 and less than the
deterministic version, and this is caused by the risk. The difference of the optimal
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utility functions are also presented, between the deterministic and stochastic cases,
see Figure 2.4. A larger x implies a larger difference due to the volatility σx. On the
other hand, to solve the Kolmorogov forward equation numerically, it is assumed
that F (10) = 1 and this leads to a boundary value problem. The density of the
equilibrium distribution of x(t) is presented in Figure 2.5 and it can be seen that
the probability density function has the maximum around the limit of 0.91.
2.4. The case where volatility depends on the contribution rate
In this section it is assumed that the risk is independent of the level of the public
good, but instead depends on the current contribution rate of the agents, i.e.,
σ(ui, uj) = σ
√
ui + uj.
The interpretation of this is that an extremely large contribution rate may cause the
public good to fluctuate more heavily than under a low contribution rate. This is in
many cases a reasonable assumption. According to equation (2.10), a Nash-optimal
control then satisfies
u∗i = V
′(x) +
σ2
2
V ′′(x).
Substituting this into the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation generates the following
value function
3σ4
8
[V ′′(x)]2+
3σ2
2
V ′′(x)V ′(x)+
3
2
[V ′(x)]2−δxV ′(x)−rV (x)−bx2+ax = 0. (2.20)
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The finite horizon approximation approach leads investor i to obtain the corre-
sponding optimal utility given by V (x) = Amx
2 +Bmx+ Cm, where
Am =
(r + 2δ)−
√
(r + 2δ)2 + 24b
12
< 0,
Bm =
6σ2A2m + a
r − 6Am + δ > 0,
Cm =
3
2r
(
σ4A2m + 2σ
2AmBm +B
2
m
)
.
Note that Am is independent of σ. The Nash-optimal strategy is then given by
u∗i (x) = 2Amx+ σ
2Am +Bm.
It is assumed that
(r + δ)2 σ2 + 12a > (r + δ)σ
√
(r + δ)2 + 24b,
which therefore implies that σ2Am + Bm > 0. This guarantees that u
∗
i (0) > 0 and
therefore that when the public good level reaches the value 0, agents have a positive
contribution rate. In the deterministic case this would be sufficient to guarantee
that the level of the public good x remains positive at all times, and therefore
that the contribution rate always remains positive and hence admissible. It also
guarantees that Cm is positive. In the stochastic case, a large negative random
shock produced by the underlying Brownian motion, could formally cause the level
x of the public good and hence also the contribution rate u∗i (x) to become negative.
In order to avoid negative contribution rates in this model, it is necessary to assume
that δ > 4σ
2A2m
σ2Am+Bm
. This is sufficient, as can be seen from the following discussion.
The state trajectory corresponding to the strategies u∗i (x) is the solution of the
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following stochastic differential equation
dx(t) =
[
4Amx(t) + 2Bm + 2σ
2Am − δx(t)
]
dt+σ
√
4Amx(t) + 2Bm + 2σ2AmdW (t)
(2.21)
Under the affine transformation z(t) = 4Amx(t) + 2Bm + 2σ
2Am = 2u
∗
i (t) the
solution of process (2.21) becomes a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process, i.e.
dz(t) = κ(θ − z(t))dt+ ν
√
z(t)dW (t),
z(0) = 4Amx0 + 2σ
2Am + 2Bm.
with κ = (δ − 4Am), θ = 2δσ2Am+2δBmδ−4Am and ν = 4σA. It is well known, Alos and
Ewald (2008) [?], that positivity is guaranteed by the condition 2κθ > ν2 which leads
exactly to the condition on δ. As z(t) = 2u∗i (t) this then guarantees that along any
realized path the contribution rate toward the public good is always positive. Any
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is mean reverting to θ with mean reversion speed κ. This
process is mean reverting to 2δσ
2Am+2δBm
δ−4Am with mean reversion speed δ−4Am. From
this it can be seen that the parameters Am and δ play an important role in how fast
the public good level will converge to its mean reversion level, leaving uncertainty
effects aside. Equation (2.6) can be rewritten as
dw(t) = (δ − 4Ac)
(
2δBc
δ − 4Ac − w(t)
)
dt
where w(t) = 4Acx(t) + 2Bc. It can be seen that the mean reversion speed of the
deterministic version is also given by δ − 4Am since Ac = Am. On the other hand,
it can be concluded from [?], page 309, that the density function of the equilibrium
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distribution of z(t) is given by
PZ(y) =
(
2β
γ2
) 2α
γ2 1
Γ
(
2α
γ2
)y 2α−γ2γ2 e− 2βγ2 y
where α = 2δ (σ2Am +Bm), β = δ − 4Am, γ = 4σAm and Γ(x) is the gamma
function. The density function for the equilibrium distribution of x(t) is given by
PX(x) = −4AmPZ(4Amx+ 2Bm + 2σ2Am)
Note that z(t) = 2u∗i (t) and therefore the density function of the equilibrium
distribution of u∗i (t) can be easily derived. Moreover, u
∗
i (t) is always non-negative
and the value of the good is bounded above. In the long term, the mean reversion
level determines the expectation, thus obtaining
lim
t→∞
E {x(t)} = 2Bm + 2σ
2Am
δ − 4Am . (2.22)
The process (2.21) describing the public good level under the equilibrium strategies
in the framework of this section is much more regular than the process described in
(2.13). In fact process (2.21) admits a stationary distribution for which analytical
formulas exist. In contrast to (2.13) the variance of (2.21) is bounded. This can
be interpreted as reduced uncertainty, once the equilibrium strategies have been
adopted. It can be seen that the expectation is functionally different from the type
of volatility given by σx and the case of the deterministic model in section 2.1. Note
however, that the Nash-equilibrium is also linear with a negative slope coefficient.
Next, the impact of the depreciation rate will be studied. For this, it is assumed
that each equation is a function of δ. It can be shown that Am is increasing and
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Bm is decreasing in δ. Indeed,
∂
∂δ
Am =
1
6

1− r + 2δ√
(r + 2δ)2 + 24b

 > 0
and
∂
∂δ
Bm =
12σ2Am
∂
∂δ
Am − 2
(
1− 6 ∂
∂δ
Am
)
(6σ2A2m + a)
r − 6Am + δ < 0.
Similarly to the case of σx, a larger depreciation rate leads the free rider effect to
be less apparent. On the other hand, because Am is independent of σ, the free rider
effect is not affected by the risk, which means that in this case it can be analogous
to the deterministic version. Note that a positive long-term expected value for the
public good level can be guaranteed by the condition Bm > −σ2Am. Economically,
it is easy to see that each investor does not have any incentive to invest into this
project, if the expectation of it is negative. This assumption also implies a positive
Cm. The Nash-equilibrium is a linear function with a negative slope and therefore
reinforces the free rider effect. By computing the first derivative of equation (2.22)
one can see that it is decreasing with δ. It can also be seen that a larger value
of depreciation rate leads to a lower project value. On the other hand, it can be
shown that the expectation of the corresponding state is less than in the case of the
deterministic model considered in section 2.1. The difference is in fact given by
2σ2Am (r + δ)
(δ − 4Am) (r − 6Am + δ) < 0.
A larger value of σ therefore implies a lower value for the expectation of the project
value. Furthermore Bm and Cm as functions of σ are increasing. In the utility
function, however, they are still offset by the effect on Am and a higher value of
σ implies a lower contribution rate under the Nash-optimal strategy, which means
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both agents invest less if the uncertainty is rising. This can be proved by computing
the derivative of u∗i with respect to σ, which is given by
d
dσ
u∗i (x) = 2σAm +
d
dσ
Bm =
2σ (r + δ)Am
r − 6Am + δ < 0
The interpretation of this is that both agents do have less investment incentive due
to higher uncertainty. On the other hand, it also leads to a lower project value.
Now, moving to the case where agents cooperate, the joint objective functional is
given by equation (2.16) and the finite horizon approximation leads the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation to be defined by
rV (t, x;T )− ∂
∂t
V (t, x;T )
= max
u1,u2
{
−u
2
1 + u
2
2
2
+ 2
(
ax− bx2)+ ∂
∂x
V (t, x;T ) (u1 + u2 − δx) + σ
2 (u1 + u2)
2
∂2
∂x2
V (t, x;T )
}
.
(2.23)
A necessary condition for maximizing equation (2.23) is given by
u∗1 = u
∗
2 =
∂
∂x
V (t, x;T ) +
σ2
2
∂2
∂x2
V (t, x;T ). (2.24)
Substituting equation (2.24) into (2.23), gives
rV (t, x;T )− ∂
∂t
V (t, x;T )
=
σ4
4
[
∂2
∂x2
V (t, x;T )
]2
+ σ2
∂
∂x
V (t, x;T )
∂2
∂x2
V (t, x;T ) +
[
∂
∂x
V (t, x;T )
]2
− δx ∂
∂x
V (t, x;T )
+ 2ax− 2bx2.
(2.25)
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The solution for equation (2.25) is given by V (t, x;T ) = A(t;T )x2 + B(t;T )x +
C(t;T ). Substituting the solution into equation (2.25), gives
A′(t;T ) = −4A(t;T )2 + (r + 2δ)A(t;T ) + 2b,
B′(t;T ) = [r − 4A(t;T ) + δ]B(t;T )− 4σ2A2(t;T )− 2a,
C ′(t;T ) = rC(t;T )− σ4A2(t;T )− 2σ2A(t;T )B(t;T )−B2(t;T ).
The finite horizon approximation leads A(t;T ), B(t;T ) and C(t;T ) to converge to
Acm =
(r+2δ)−
√
(r+2δ)2+32b
8
, Bcm =
4σ2(Acm)
2+2a
r−4Acm+δ and C
c
m =
1
r
[
σ4 (Acm)
2 + 2σ2AcmB
c
m + (B
c
m)
2],
respectively. Note that Acm is not dependent on σ, which means that no matter how
large σ is, the free rider effect is not affected. Since Ap = Am and A
c
p = A
c
m when
σ = 0 , Acm ≤ Am, which means that the free rider effect is more apparent under
cooperation. On the other hand, when x is sufficiently large, the joint optimal
utility function is larger than the sum of optimal utility functions. However, due to
the property of the public good, agents do not prefer a larger x. Because they free
ride others heavily when x is large, it is realistic that agents cooperate to reduce
x. It can be seen that the limit of expectation for the corresponding state under
cooperation is larger than under non-cooperation. Indeed,
2Bcm + 2σ
2Acm
δ − 4Acm
−2Bm + 2σ
2Am
δ − 4Am =
2 [δ (Bm −Bcm) + δσ2 (Am − Acm) + 4 (AmBcm − AcmBm)]
(δ − 4Am) (δ − 4Acm)
is increasing in σ and the case that σ = 0 has been proved in the previous section.
Numerical results are provided for this case using the same parameters as in
section 2.3. In Figure 2.6 similar behaviour can be observed to the case of level
dependent volatility, i.e., σx. In Figure 2.7, it can be seen that for any fixed x,
the optimal utility function is increasing. In Figure 2.8, the expectation converges
to around 0.92; in contrast with the case of σx, it is closer to the maximum of a
2b
.
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The difference of the optimal utility functions between deterministic and stochastic
versions is represented in Figure 2.9. It can be seen that the difference is less than in
the case of level dependent volatility. This is realistic because agents can reduce the
uncertainty by choosing their contribution rate. On the other side, comparison with
Figure 2.4 shows that a lower x implies a larger difference while in Figure 2.9, this
is reversed. The density function of the equilibrium distribution x(t) is presented
in Figure 2.10, and similar to Figure 2.5, the probability density function has the
maximum at 0.92.
2.5. Conclusions
Fershtman and Nitzan’s model [?] has been successfully extended by introduc-
ing two different uncertainty effects. The first effect is due to level dependent
volatility, while the second effect is due to contribution related volatility. In both
cases analytical solution of the Nash-equilibrium strategies understood as stationary
Markovian Nash-equilibria strategies have been computed. This analysis also shows
that uncertainty affects the strategies of the agents.In opposition to the idea that
an increase in uncertainty may reduce the free rider effect, it was found that in
fact in the case where volatility is dependent on the level of the public good, the
free rider effect is emphasized by uncertainty. Lastly, it was evident that under the
same level of public good in both cases, the free rider effect is more apparent when
agents are allowed to cooperate. These results might be of particular interest in
public insurance.
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Graphical Illustration
Figure 2.1: Value function in terms of x and δ for volatility depending on the level of
the public good under r = 0.1, σ = 0.2, a = 2 and b = 1
Figure 2.2: Value function in terms of x and σ for volatility depending on the level of
the public good under r = 0.1, δ = 0.3, a = 2 and b = 1
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Figure 2.3: State and limit for volatility depending on the level of the public good under
r = 0.1, δ = 0.3, σ = 0.2, a = 2, b = 1 and T = 10
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0.125
0.13
0.135
0.14
0.145
0.15
Difference of optimal utility function between determinsitic and stochastic versions
x
D
iff
er
en
ce
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Figure 2.5: The Density function of the equilibrium distribution of x(t) for the volatility
depending on the level of the public good under r = 0.1, δ = 0.3, σ = 0.2, a = 2 and b = 1
Figure 2.6: Value function in terms of x and δ for volatility depending on the contribution
rate under r = 0.1, σ = 0.2, a = 2 and b = 1
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Figure 2.7: Value function in terms of x and σ for volatility depending on the contribution
rate under r = 0.1, δ = 0.3, a = 2 and b = 1
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Figure 2.8: State and limit for volatility depending on the contribution rate under r =
0.1, δ = 0.3, σ = 0.2, a = 2, b = 1 and T = 10
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Figure 2.10: The density function of the equilibrium distribution of x(t) for volatility
depending on the contribution rate under r = 0.1, δ = 0.3, σ = 0.2, a = 2 and b = 1
Chapter 3
A Stochastic Differential Fishery
Game for a Two Species Fish
Population with Ecological
Interaction
The first mathematical models of fisheries were developed in the 1950’s with the
works of Gordon (1954) [?] and Schaefer (1957) [?]. Clark (1976) built on these
early models and considered the conflict between agents fishing for the same species
in a dynamic game model, see [?]. Various recent works focus on continuous time
and are based on differential game models. Among them are Dockner et al. (1989)
[?], Haurie et al. (1994) [?], Jorgensen and Yeung (1996) [?] and Kaitala (1989) [?].
All consider the case of a single species. Kaitala (1989) presented a deterministic
game model in which he assumed that the price of the species is given by a constant
p while costs for each agent i are defined by a proportionality constant ci, see [?]. He
studied the competitive case and derived a feedback Nash-equilibrium. Hamalainen,
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Haurie and Kaitala (1985) studied a slightly different model and derived an open-
loop Nash equilibrium, see [?]. The authors also considered the cooperative case and
provided two numerical examples. Dockner et al. (1989) considered a continuous
time framework involving uncertainty, see [?]. They studied the non cooperative case
and followed the concept used in Clark (1980) [?] and Simaan et al. (1978) [?] for
the specification of a price function. Dockner et al. assumed that the price depends
on the quantity harvested by all agents. Furthermore, Dockner et al. derived not
only a feedback Nash-equilibrium but also a Stackelberg-equilibrium. Hamalainen
et al. (1994) [?] studied the cooperative case and Haurie (1991) (1993) extended
on these ideas in [?] and [?] to model the triggering mechanism as a Markov jump
process and the retaliation duration as an exponential random variable. Jorgensen
and Yeung (1996) studied a model where the concept of price is similar to [?] and
costs are not constant, but depend on a function which is decreasing in the stock
of biomass, see [?]. These authors derived a feedback Nash equilibrium and also
considered the cooperative case. Moreover, they also analyzed surplus maximization
and optimal market size.
This chapter will examine a model where fishery agents compete against each
other to fish for two different species. Ecologically, these two species are assumed
to interact with each other. The assumed interactions include the cases of predator,
prey and competition. The model is assumed to be time homogeneous and each
agent to be facing an infinite time horizon. The case of a two species predatory
game theoretic fishery model has been studied before by Quirk and Smith (1977)
[?] and Anderson (1975) [?] and furthermore by Sumaila (1997) [?]. Sumaila focused
on the case of the Barents Sea and the species Cod and Capelin. In this particular
case, Cod preys on Capelin and Sumaila provides various results which document the
importance of studying fisheries within a general multi-species ecological context.
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Without this realization, game theoretic models will produce inefficient fishery
strategies. In particular Sumaila compares the situation where two fisheries are
managed by their individual owners with fishing rights exclusive for one particular
species, with the case of joint management or competitive fishing of both species. He
showed that the ecological interaction of the two species has a significant economical
effect on the fisheries.
The models considered by Sumaila (1998), Quirk and Smith (1977) and Anderson
(1975) are neither continuous time, nor do they include ecological uncertainty.
Both of these aspects are, however, crucial for the setup of a realistic dynamic
model. The aspect of continuous time can, in principle, be mimicked by using a
discrete time model with small enough time steps, but the case presented here
allows computation of semi analytic solutions which are numerically tractable.
The inclusion of ecological uncertainty is fundamental and new in this context.
In a world of climate change and increasing sea temperatures with unpredictable
effects, the author and his supervisor consider it to be an absolutely necessary.
A consequence of including ecological interaction in this way is, of course, that
mathematically the model becomes far more challenging than corresponding single
species models. The analysis requires solution of partial differential equations
including two state variables, rather than a differential equation depending on single
state variable in the time homogeneous case. Nevertheless it has been possible to
solve the model semi-analytically, by which it is meant that the author and his
supervisor have derived explicit forms for the strategies and value function which
depend on certain constants, which can be computed numerically by an iterative
process. Following this, there is a discussion of how different parameters affect the
solution and their economical interpretation. In addition to the setup where each
fishery can harvest both species, the case where fisheries are restricted to harvest
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only one of the two species is examined, as well as the case where the fisheries
cooperate, e.g. are jointly managed. In both cases, the economic consequences are
highlighted, along with the ecological impact. One significant observation is that
a competitive ecological system may thrive better under cooperative management,
while a predatory ecological system may thrive better under competition between
the fisheries. These results are considered to have very striking policy implications.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: in section 3.1, there is a brief
review of a typical deterministic model of two ecologically interacting species and,
based on this set up, the current game theoretic model which includes uncertainty.
This model will be analyzed to derive a feedback Nash equilibrium by the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman approach. Section 3.2 contains a detailed sensitivity analysis. In
section 3.3, the case where regulation restricts each fishery to concentrate on one
particular species is examined, together with the economic inefficiencies and con-
sequences resulting from this. Section 3.4 introduces the concept of cooperation
between the fisheries. Section 3.5 presents the numerical results and the main
conclusions are summarized in section 3.6.
3.1. A stochastic differential fishery game with ecological interaction
The case of deterministic combined predator-prey and competitive interactions
will first be briefly reviewed. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) have presented various
examples of such dynamic systems, see in particular [?], page 11 for a predator-
prey dynamic and page 26 for a competitive dynamic. These two models have
been combined and modified accordingly with the aim of achieving an analytically
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tractable model. The result is the following dynamics:
x′1(t) = x1(t)
[
α1√
x1(t)
− β1 − γ1
√
x2(t)
x1(t)
]
x′2(t) = x2(t)
[
α2√
x2(t)
− β2 − γ2
√
x1(t)
x2(t)
]
.
(3.1)
In this interpretation xi(t) represents the biomass of species i at t. All coefficients
are assumed to be constant. The birth rate of species j is given by
αj√
xj
and the
death rate by βj. There are effects on the size of biomass of both species due to
predation of one species on the other, as well as competition. The function
Fj(xj) = xj
[
αj√
xj
− βj − γj
√
xj′
xj
]
is referred to as the natural growth function for species j = 1, 2. The case of a pure
predator-prey system where species 2 hunts species 1 is represented α1 > 0, α2 < 0,
β1 = β2 = 0, γ1 < 0 and γ2 > 0, compare [?] equation (2.1). A purely competitive
system is represented by the case where all constant are positive. Four stationary
points can be derived from this dynamic and are given by (0, 0),
(
α2
1
β2
1
, 0
)
,
(
0,
α2
2
β2
2
)
and
((
α1β2−α2γ1
β1β2−γ1γ2
)2
,
(
α1γ2−α2β1
β1β2−γ1γ2
)2)
. Linearization of system (4.1) around the latter
gives

 x′1
x′2

 =


α1
2
√
x∗
1
− β1 − γ1
√
x∗
2
2
√
x∗
1
−γ1
√
x∗
1
2
√
x∗
2
−γ2
√
x∗
2
2
√
x∗
1
α2
2
√
x∗
2
− β2 − γ2
√
x∗
1
2
√
x∗
2



 x1 − x∗1
x2 − x∗2

 (3.2)
where (x∗1, x
∗
2) =
((
α1β2−α2γ1
β1β2−γ1γ2
)2
,
(
α1γ2−α2β1
β1β2−γ1γ2
)2)
. The other fixed points will not be
analysed because, in these cases, at least one species has become extinct, and in
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this case the resulting model is identical to a single species model. The eigenvalues
of the matrix in system (3.2) are computed via
e± =
(a11 + a22)±
√
(a11 + a22)
2 − 4 (a11a22 − γ1γ2)
2
where
a11 =
α1
2
√
x∗1
− β1 − γ1
√
x∗2
2
√
x∗1
a22 =
α2
2
√
x∗2
− β2 − γ2
√
x∗1
2
√
x∗2
.
Note that
√
(a11 + a22)
2 − 4 (a11a22 − γ1γ2) is always positive. If e± are both nega-
tive, then the fixed point is asymptotically stable and both species survive. This is
the case of stable coexistence; see Figure 3.1. Conversely, if e+ > 0 and e− < 0, the
fixed point is unstable. Without intervention, one of the two species will eventually
become extinct. This case is called a bistable case, see Figure 3.2.
When introducing the effect of fisheries harvesting, both populations introduce
ecological uncertainty into the system (3.1). Jorgensen et al. (1989) (1996), see
[?] and [?], regarded the control ui for agent i as the harvest rate of species i.
Alternatively, Kaitala et al. (1994) (1989) defined the control for i as the fishing
effort, see also [?] and [?]. This analysis will follow the line of Jorgensen et al. and
define the control as the harvest rate for each agent. The state equations for the
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biomass of the two species are then given by
dx1(t) =
{
x1(t)
[
α1√
x1(t)
− β1 − γ1
√
x2(t)
x1(t)
]
−
N∑
i=1
u1i (t)
}
dt+ σ1x1(t)dW1(t)
dx2(t) =
{
x2(t)
[
α2√
x2(t)
− β2 − γ2
√
x1(t)
x2(t)
]
−
N∑
i=1
u2i (t)
}
dt+ σ2x2(t)dW2(t)
(3.3)
where αi, βi, γi and σi have the same interpretation as before and N is the number
of fishery agents. W1(t) and W2(t) are two Wiener processes. For simplicity it
is assumed that W1(t) and W2(t) are uncorrelated. The harvest rate of species j
adopted by agent i is denoted as uji . Note that xj = 0 forces u
j
i = 0 because it is
impossible to harvest an extinct species. This poses natural restrictions on the set
of admissible controls. Each agent tries to maximize his or her objective functional,
given by
max
u1i ,u
2
i
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rt
2∑
j=1
[
P j(t)uji (t)− Cji (t)uji (t)
]
dt |x1(0) = x10, x2(0) = x20
}
(3.4)
where r is a discount rate. P j(t) and Cji (t) are price and cost functions of species
j for agent i, respectively. It is proposed that the price function is given by
P j(t) =
1√
pj
∑N
i=1 u
j
i (t)
, j = 1, 2 (3.5)
and the cost function for agent i is defined as
Cji (t) =
cji√
xj(t)
, j = 1, 2 (3.6)
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where pj and c
j
i are constants. that this uses the same cost functions as Jorgensen
and Yeung (1996) [?] and the price functions have been multiplied by 1√
pj
because
this is a two species model. Equation (3.5) implies that prices decrease as the
amount of total harvest increases. This accounts for the relationship between supply
and demand. On the other hand, in equation (3.6), a larger value of stock of biomass
j implies a lower value of costs for i. This assumption is also realistic. It is proposed
that cji = cj and this leads the model to be time homogeneous and symmetric. Under
this perspective the objective will be to identify a stationary symmetric feedback
Nash-equilibrium. Within a time homogeneous framework, the value function sat-
isfying the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation does not explicitly depend on time.
While this reduces the dimension of the PDE by one, it brings with it the loss of
the terminal condition, which helps to identify the value function. Classically, a so
called transversality condition is employed, see [?], page 124. In most cases this
transversality condition can, however, only be effectively used when the structure
of the value function is known. In a framework which relies on numerical solution of
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, the transversality condition is in many cases
not practicable. Therefore, the finite horizon approximation approach is employed
again, which was introduced in section 1.2 and applied in the previous chapter.
Now supposing that T is a finite terminal time. Then the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation for agent i is given by
rVi(t, x;T )− ∂
∂t
Vi(t, x;T ) = max
u1i ,u
2
i


2∑
j=1

 u
j
i√
pj
(
uji +
∑
k 6=i u
j∗
k
) − cjuji√xj +
σ2jx
2
j
2
∂2
∂x2j
Vi(t, x;T )
+
∂
∂xj
Vi(t, x;T )
(
αj
√
xj − βjxj − γj√x1x2 − uji −
∑
k 6=i
uj∗k
)]}
(3.7)
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where x = (x1, x2). A necessary condition for maximizers u
j∗
i of the right hand side
of (4.7) is
uj∗i =
(2N − 1)2
4pjN3
(
cj√
xj
+ ∂
∂xj
Vi(t, x;T )
)2 , j = 1, 2. (3.8)
Substituting equation (4.8) into equation (4.7), produces the following partial dif-
ferential equation
rVi(t, x;T ) =
2∑
j=1

 2N − 1
2pjN2
(
cj√
xj
+ ∂
∂xj
Vi(t, x;T )
) − cj (2N − 1)2
4pjN3
√
xj
(
cj√
xj
+ ∂
∂xj
Vi(t, x;T )
)2
+
∂
∂xj
Vi(t, x;T )

αj√xj − βjxj − γj√x1x2 − (2N − 1)2
4pjN2
(
cj√
xj
+ ∂
∂xj
Vi(t, x;T )
)2


+
σ2jx
2
j
2
∂2
∂x2j
Vi(t, x;T )
]
+
∂
∂t
Vi(t, x;T )
(3.9)
with boundary condition given by
Vi(T, x;T ) = 0 (3.10)
Following the solution form provided by Jorgensen and Yeung [?], it is assumed that
the solution of (3.9) with boundary condition (3.10) is of the following type
Vi(t, x;T ) = A1(t)
√
x1 + A2(t)
√
x2 + A3(t). (3.11)
Note that if W1(t) and W2(t) are correlated, the solution does not follow the form
(3.11). Substituting equation (3.11) into equation (3.9), results in a system of
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ordinary differential equations
A′1(t;T ) = k1A1(t;T )−
2N − 1
p1N2 (2c1 + A1(t;T ))
+
(2c1 +NA1(t;T )) (2N − 1)2
2p1N3 (2c1 + A1(t;T ))
2 +
γ2A2(t;T )
2
,
A′2(t;T ) = k2A2(t;T )−
2N − 1
p2N2 (2c2 + A2(t;T ))
+
(2c2 +NA2(t;T )) (2N − 1)2
2p2N3 (2c2 + A2(t;T ))
2 +
γ1A1(t;T )
2
,
A′3(t;T ) = rA3(t;T )−
α1A1(t;T ) + α2A2(t;T )
2
,
(3.12)
where kj =
(
r +
βj
2
+
σ2j
8
)
. First considering the case of a two species competitive
ecological system, i.e., all coefficients are positive. To apply the finite horizon
approximation approach, it is necessary to find out the fixed points of the system
(3.12) and examine which one satisfies equation (3.10). To derive the fixed points,
the following polynomial system must be solved
k1A1 − 2N − 1
p1N2 (2c1 + A1)
+
(2c1 +NA1) (2N − 1)2
2p1N3 (2c1 + A1)
2 +
γ2A2
2
= 0 (3.13)
k2A2 − 2N − 1
p2N2 (2c2 + A2)
+
(2c2 +NA2) (2N − 1)2
2p2N3 (2c2 + A2)
2 +
γ1A1
2
= 0 (3.14)
rA3 − α1A1 + α2A2
2
= 0 (3.15)
In equation (3.15), A3 can be easily derived from A1 and A2. So the solution starts
by concentrating on equation (3.13) and (3.14). Note that if A2 is fixed in [0, X2),
with
X2 =
2N − 1
2c1γ2p1N3
,
equation (3.13) is a cubic polynomial and it can be shown that it has a unique
positive solution. Existence can be proved by the intermediate value theorem and
uniqueness can be shown by contradiction. A similar argument works for equation
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(3.14) if an A1 is given and lies in [0, X1), where X1 is defined by
X1 =
2N − 1
2c2γ1p2N3
.
In [?], the authors claimed that the solution is given by the form A
√
x+B and A is
positive to guarantee that the value function is concave. However, this model, has a
more complex dynamic with interactions between the two species and it is not clear
why the value function should be concave, neither mathematically nor economically.
On the other hand, it is assumed that fishery agents can benefit more from species
j if the biomass is larger and this guarantees that Aj is positive. The following
proposition says that the system of equations (3.13) and (3.14) have a unique pair
of positive solutions.
Proposition 3.1.1. (Competitive Case) Equations (3.13) and (3.14) have a unique
pair of positive solutions (A1, A2), if, for (j, j
′) = (1, 2) and (2, 1), one of the
following conditions holds:
Condition (1). 4c1c2pj′γj ≤ (2N − 1) (2N − 3)
N2
Condition (2). Xj ≥
−2cjkj +
√
2c1c2pj′γj
pj
− (2N−1)(2N−3)
2pjN2
kj
with Xj defined above.
Proof. For the existence, a constructive proof is presented, as within the numerical
analysis it is necessary to compute a pair of solutions, and the method described
in this proof is used. Starting with X ′j =
2N−1
2cjγj′pjN
3 , where (j, j
′) = (1, 2) and (2, 1).
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Consider the polynomials
fj(x) = kjx
3 + 4cjkjx
2 +
[
4c2jkj +
(2N − 1) (2N − 3)
2pjN2
]
x+
cj (1− 2N)
pjN3
gj(x) =
γj′
2
(2cj + x)
2
(3.16)
Note that equation (3.13) can be represented as f1(A1)+g1(A1)A2 = 0 and equation
(3.14) can be represented by f2(A2) + g2(A2)A1 = 0. Substituting Xj into fj(x),
gives
fj(Xj) = Xj
[
kjX
2
j + 4cjkjXj +
(
4c2jkj +
(2N − 1) (2N − 3)
2pjN2
− 2c1c2pj′γj
pj
)]
(3.17)
Each condition implies that the right hand side of equation (3.17) is positive. Since
fj(x) is continuous and fj(0) < 0, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists
an A∗1 such that fj(A
∗
j) = 0, which implies that (0, X2) and (A
∗
1, 0) solve equation
(3.13). Similarly, (X1, 0) and (0, A
∗
2) solve equation (4.14). On the other hand , in
equation (3.13) and (3.14), a positive root Aj is decreasing as Aj′ is increasing. Note
that (0, X2) solves equation (3.14). Constructing two convergent sequences. Setting
A∗2 = A
1
2, substituting A
1
2 into equation (3.13) into equation (3.13) and solving it,
gives the positive A11. Similarly, substituting A
1
1 into equation (3.14), gives the
positive A22. Repeating this process results in a sequence {a1, b1, a2, b2, ..., an, bn, ...},
where
an = (A
n
1 , A
n
2 ) , n = 1, 2, 3, ...
bn =
(
An1 , A
n+1
2
)
, n = 1, 2, 3, ...
It can be seen that an and bn solve equation (3.13) and (3.14), respectively. Fur-
thermore, {An1} is increasing and {An2} is decreasing. The reason for this is that
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Aj is increasing if and only if Aj′ is decreasing, and the process of constructing
the sequence {an, bn} guarantees this. Since A∗1 is an upper bound of {An1} and
0 is a lower bound of {An2}, they are both convergent and the limit solves both
equations (3.13) and (3.14). Note that the existence can also be proved by the
intermediate value theorem. Now, moving on to prove the uniqueness: let F13(A1)
and F14(A1) denote the implicit functions that solve equations (3.13) and (3.14),
i.e. (A1, F13(A1)) solves (3.13) for all A1 and (A2, F14(A1)) solves (3.14) for all A1.
Uniqueness would then follow, if it can be shown that there exists at most one
A1 s.t. F13(A1) = F14(A1). The latter would hold, if it can shown that F13 is
concave and F14 is convex. Note that, since F13(0) = X2 > F14(0) = A
∗
2, this would
also guarantee existence of a pair of solutions, as established in the first part, but
this proof of existence is non-constructive. It is now necessary to show that F13 is
concave and F14 is convex. In equation (3.13), A2 can be represented by a function
of A1, i.e., A2 = −f1(A1)g1(A1) = F13(A1). It can be shown that A2 is strictly decreasing,
as the derivative is given by
dA2
dA1
=
−f ′1(A1)g1(A1) + f1(A1)g′1(A1)
g21(A1)
Note that either condition (1) or (2) implies that f1(A1) is negative in [0, A
∗
1). It
can be proved that −f ′1(A1)g1(A1) + f1(A1)g′1(A1) is decreasing by deriving the
derivative,
d
dA1
[−f ′1(A1)g1(A1) + f1(A1)g′1(A1)] = −f ′′1 (A1)g1(A1) + f1(A1)g′′1(A1) < 0
and g1(A1) is strictly increasing. This implies that
dA2
dA1
is a strictly decreasing
function, which means that the second derivative of F13(A1) is negative. Therefore,
A2 is a strictly decreasing and strictly concave function of A1. Similarly, in equation
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(3.14), A1 =
f2(A2)
g2(A2)
is a strictly concave function of A2. Since
f2(A2)
g2(A2)
is strictly
decreasing, the inverse function exists. It can be shown that the inverse function of
a strictly convex function is strictly concave by the definition. Therefore, F13(A1)
is strictly concave and F14(A1) is strictly convex and uniqueness is guaranteed. 
Proposition 3.1.1 shows that under the given assumptions Vi(t, x;T ) has a limit
given by A1
√
x1 + A2
√
x2 + A3, where A1, A2 and A3 are the positive fixed points
of (3.12). Indeed, supposing that
Ω = {(A1(t;T ), A2(t;T )) ≥ (0, 0) |A′1(t;T ) ≤ 0, A′2(t;T ) ≤ 0} ,
, it can be seen that Ω is non empty since (F (t), 0) ∈ Ω for some functions F (t) <
2N−1
2c1γ2p1N3
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that the first two equations in system (3.10) can be
rewritten as
A′1(t;T ) =
f1(A1(t;T ))
(2c1 + A1(t;T ))
2 +
γ2A2(t;T )
2
,
A′2(t;T ) =
f2(A2(t;T ))
(2c2 + A2(t;T ))
2 +
γ1A1(t;T )
2
,
where fj(x) is defined in (3.16). It can be proved that the RHS of the above two
equations are increasing in A1(t;T ) and A2(t;T ), respectively. Indeed,
d
dx
fj(x)
(2cj + x)
2 =
f ′j(x) (2cj + x)− 2fj(x)
(2cj + x)
3 > 0,
d
dx
γjx
2
=
γj
2
> 0,
if a pair of functions is chosen such that (A1(0;T ), A2(0;T )) is in Ω. Since they
solve the above system, which is equivalent to system (3.12), and the derivatives
are negative at t = 0, it can be seen that the derivatives are always negative for all
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t ∈ [0, T ] and A1(T ;T ) = A2(T ;T ) = 0. On the other hand, as T tends to infinity,
each Aj, j = 1, 2, 3, tends to its unique positive fixed point. This can be shown by
computing the sign of fj(Aj(s)) + gj(Aj(s))Aj′(s), where s = T − t. Therefore, a
stationary symmetric feedback Nash equilibrium of the infinite horizon model for
agent i is given by
uj∗i (xj) =
(2N − 1)2 xj
pjN3 (2cj + Aj)
2 , j = 1, 2 (3.18)
and the corresponding optimal utility function is defined by
Vi(x1, x2) = A1
√
x1 + A2
√
x2 + A3. (3.19)
Note that in equation (3.18), u∗i (0) = 0. This guarantees that the strategy pair
derived is admissible. It can be proved that equation (3.19) is indeed a solution
of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the infinite horizon model. A minor
adaptation of a standard verification theorem such as Oksendal, [?] Theorem 11.2.1
implies that the function Vi(x1, x2) is in fact the value function for the stochastic
differential game. The details are omitted here.
Moving on to the case of a predator-prey system. Without loss of generality, it
is assumed that α1 < 0, α2 > 0, β1 = β2 = 0, γ1 < 0 and γ2 > 0, i.e., x1 is the
predator and x2 is the prey. The following proposition guarantees that equation
(3.13) and (3.14) have a unique pair of positive roots in [0, X1] × [A12, X2], where
A12 is defined in the proof of Proposition 3.1.1 and X1 is the unique root for f1(A1)
defined in system (3.16).
Proposition 3.1.2. (Predator-Prey Case) The system of equations in (3.13) and
(3.14) have a unique pair of positive roots in [0, X]× [A12, X2] if one of the following
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conditions
Condition (1). 4c1c2p1γ2 ≤ (2N − 1) (2N − 3)
N2
Condition (2). X2 ≥
−2c2k2 +
√
2c1c2p1γ2
p2
− (2N−1)(2N−3)
2p2N2
k2
and
Condition (3). 48c22k2p2N
3 ≥ (2N − 1) (2N − 3)
hold.
Proof. To prove the existence and uniqueness of the pair of positive roots, this
analysis takes advantage of system (3.16). Note that either condition (1) or (2)
implies that f2(A2) has a root at A
1
2 < X2. On the other hand, it has been already
shown that A2 = −f1(A1)g1(A1) is decreasing in [0, X1]. Condition (3) leads A1 = −
f2(A2)
g2(A2)
to be a strictly increasing function in [A12,∞), which therefore implies that the
inverse function exists and increases in [0,∞). Continuing with the notation F13(A1)
and F14(A1) from the competitive case and it can be seen that F13(A1) is decreasing
and F14(A1) is increasing in [0, X1]. Moreover, F13(0) = X2 > F14(0) = A
1
2 and
F13(X1) = 0 < F14(X1). It can be proved via the intermediate value theorem that
there exists a pair of positive roots. On the other hand, since F13(A1) and F14(A1)
are strictly decreasing and increasing respectively, uniqueness is guaranteed. 
To guarantee that the (A1(t;T ), A2(t;T )) converges to (A1, A2) for T tending to
infinity, the idea for the competitive case is adopted. Note that it is necessary to
start at some points in [0, X]× [A12, X2] instead of [0, X1]× [0, X2]. The details are
omitted here.
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3.2. Sensitivity analysis
This section will examine how each of the various parameters affects the optimal
utility and control functions. This will start with the case of a two species competi-
tive ecological system. The discussion will be divided into three parts: The first part
consists of considering the coefficients which do not relate to equation (3.13) and
(3.14); the second part will study those that affect only one of equations (3.13) and
(3.14); while the last part consists of considering those which change both equations
(3.13) and (3.14). It can be seen that αj is the only coefficient which is not related to
equation (3.13) and (3.14). It is then obvious that A1 and A2 do not depend on αj,
but A3, however does. In fact, A3 is increasing as either α1 or α2 is increasing. As
indicated above, αj is related to the birth rate of species j and it can be seen that a
higher birth rate leads to a larger optimal utility. The coefficients affecting only one
of the equations (3.13) and (3.14) are r and N . Taking the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2.1. (Competitive Case) The fixed point A1 and A2 are both de-
creasing in r and N .
Proof. The concept of this proof is similar to Proposition 3.1.1 and it will use the
same notation. Given r′ > r, we construct sequences Bi1 and B
i
2 in analogy to the
proof of Proposition 3.1.1. For the r′ equation (3.16) has a lower unique positive
root, for j = 1, 2. Suppose that (0, B12) solves equation (3.14). Then it can be seen
that B12 < A
1
2. Substituting B
1
2 into equation (3.13) allows derivation of the positive
root B11 . Now it can be seen that in equation (3.13), for a fixed A2, the positive root
A1 is decreasing as r is increasing: : Differentiating equation (3.13) with respect to
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r, gives
A31 + 3k1A
2
1
∂
∂r
A1 + 4c1A
2
1 + 8c1k1A1
∂
∂r
A1 + 4c
2
1k1A1
+
[
4c21k1 +
(2N − 1) (2N − 3)
2p1N2
]
∂
∂r
A1 + (γ2A1A2 + 2c1γ2A2)
∂
∂r
A1 = 0
(3.20)
Performing the same operation with equation (3.14), but omitting the computation
from the resulting two equations, by extracting ∂
∂r
A1 and using condition (1), it
can be seen that ∂
∂r
A1 < 0. Substitute B
1
2 into equation (3.13) with r to derive
the positive root A1 and compare it to B
1
1 . It can be seen that B
1
1 is lower than
A1. Substituting B
1
1 into equation (3.14) and deriving the positive root B
2
2 , it can
be shown that B22 is lower than the positive root of equation (3.14) with r and B
1
1 .
Repeating this process allows construction of a sequence which is lower than the one
we have constructed with r. Furthermore, the sequence satisfies the same properties
we have mentioned in the proof of Proposition 3.1.1. Therefore, the limit is lower
than the one with r.
Looking at the case of N , it was proved earlier that, with a fixed value of A2, in
equation (3.13), a larger N implies a lower positive root A1 and similarly, it can be
shown that equation (3.14) has the same property with a fixed A1. The derivative
of equation (3.13) with respect to N is given by
3k1A
2
1
∂
∂N
A1 + 8c1k1A1
∂
∂N
A1 +
4N − 3
p1N4
A1 +
[
4c21k1 +
(2N − 1) (2N − 3)
2p1N2
]
∂
∂N
A1
+
cj (4N − 3)
pjN4
= 0.
(3.21)
Similarly, a sequence can be constructed which satisfies all properties in Proposition
3.1.1, but is lower than the one in Proposition 3.1.1. The idea is similar to the case
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of r and the proof is omitted. 
It follows from Proposition 3.2.1 that a larger discount r implies a lower optimal
utility. On the other hand, it follows from equation (3.18), that uj∗i is increasing
as r increases. The economic interpretation of this is that agents facing a larger
discount rate have to harvest more to keep higher payoffs. The impact of the number
of agents on individuals is that optimal utility is decreased when N is increased.
Furthermore
lim
N→∞
uj∗i (xj) = lim
N→∞
(2N − 1)2 xj
pjN3 (2cj + Aj)
2 = 0, j = 1, 2.
On the other hand, since
d
dN
(2N − 1)2
N3
= −(2N − 1) (2N − 3)
N4
< 0,
d
dN
(2N − 1)2
N2
=
4N − 2
N3
> 0,
more agents joining the fishery game implies a greater aggregate amount of harvest
of species j, but a lower individual harvest of species j for each agent.
Now, moving on to the second case, i.e., those coefficients which change only one
of the equations (3.13) and (3.14). They are cj, pj, βj, γj and σj for j = 1, 2. In
the case of cj, economically, a larger cj implies a larger cost of xj and intuitively,
agents may harvest less xj, which implies that Aj is increasing in cj. However,
mathematically this is not correct. Even though the cost of xj increases, xj may be
still more profitable than x′j and each agent could still have an incentive to harvest
more xj. The numerical example presented in section 3.5 is a counterexample. The
following propositions examine the remaining parameters:
Proposition 3.2.2. (Competitive Case) For a fixed pj′, Aj is increasing and Aj′
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is decreasing as pj is decreasing. This result also holds for βj and σj. On the other
hand, for a fixed cj′ or γj′, a larger γj leads to a larger Aj and a lower Aj′.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we suppose that j = 1. First considering the
case of p1. Note that p1 is not a coefficient in equation (3.14). Multiply equation
(3.13) by 2p1N
3 (2c1 + A1)
2 and fix A2. The derivative of this equation with respect
to p1 is given by
k1N
3A1 (2c1 + A1)
2 + 2k1p1N
3A1 (2c1 + A1)
∂
∂p1
A1 + k1p1N
3 (2c1 + A1)
2 ∂
∂p1
A1
+ 2N (N − 1) (2N − 1) ∂
∂p1
A1 + γ2N
3A2 (2c1 + A1)
2 + 2p1γ2N
3A2 (2c1 + A1)
∂
∂p1
A1 = 0.
(3.22)
It follows from equation (3.22) that ∂
∂p1
A1 < 0. By applying the same idea as in the
proof of Proposition 3.1.1. For p′1 > p1, a sequence (B
i
1, B
i
2) is constructed which is
compared to the original sequence (Ai1, A
i
2). First solve equation (3.16) with j = 2
and then derive the positive root A12. It can be seen that (0, A
1
2) is a solution of
equation (3.14). Substituting of A12 into equation (3.13) allows derivation of the
positive root B11 . It is lower than A
1
1 derived in Proposition 3.1.1. Using B
1
1 to find
the positive root B22 in equation (3.14), it can be seen that B
2
2 is larger than A
2
2 in
Proposition 3.1.1. Repeating this process, gives
Bn1 < A
n
1 , n = 1, 2, ...
Bn2 > A
n
2 , n = 1, 2, ....
Therefore, the limit of Bn1 for n tending to infinity is lower than A1 and the limit
of Bn2 is larger than A2. The same argument also works for the cases of βj and σj.
On the other hand, in the case of γj, for fixed γ2, equation (3.14) for a fixed A2
72
implies that
∂
∂γ1
A1 =
f2(A2)γ1 (2c2 + A2)
g22(A2)
< 0 (3.23)
which therefore implies that A1 is decreasing as γ1 is increasing. Starting at (0, A
1
2)
which was constructed in the proof in Proposition 3.1.1. Substituting A12 = B
1
2
into equation (3.13), the positive root is given by B11 = A
1
1. Now substitute B
1
1
into equation (3.14) and the positive root is B22 . Since A1 is decreasing as γ1 is
increasing, B22 < a
2
2 and iteratively B
i
2 < a
i
2 . Similarly, the relationship B
i
1 > A
i
1
can be obtained. Therefore, the result holds. 
In the case of pj, a lower pj implies a higher price of xj, see equation (3.5). Agents
will then harvest less xj and more xj′ to keep high utility. The coefficients βj, σj and
γj all have an impact on xj. It can be seen that larger βj, σj and γj lead to a smaller
xj. There are differences between the coefficients, though. In the case of βj and
σj, a larger βj or σj leads agents to have more incentives to harvest xj now, as the
biomass of xj is likely to be less in the future. On the other side, although a higher
γj implies a lower biomass of xj, agents can harvest more xj′ to keep the stock of xj
at a higher level, which reduces the harvest of xj and increases the harvest of xj′ .
Moving on to the case of a predator-prey system.
Proposition 3.2.3. (Predatory Case) A2 is decreasing in either r or N .
Proof. Let r′ > r be given and fix A1. It can be shown that f1,r′(A1) > f1,r(A1),
which hence implies that F13,r′(A1) = −f1,r′ (A1)g1(A1) < −
f1,r(A1)
g1(A1)
= F13,r(A1). For any
increasing function H(x) defined on [0, X1] with H(0) < F13,r′(0), where X has been
defined in the proof of Proposition 3.1.2, F13,r′(A1) − H(A1) < F13,r(A1) − H(A1)
and F13,r′(xr′) < F13,r(xr), where xr′ and xr are the roots of F13,r′(A1)−H(A1) and
F13,r(A1) − H(A1) respectively. It can be proved via condition (3) in Proposition
3.1.2 that F14,r′(A1) < F14,r(A1). On the other hand, it can also be shown that
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for any decreasing function K(x) defined on [0, X] with K(0) > F14,r(0), K(A1) −
F14,r′(A1) > K(A1) − F14,r(A1) as well as F14,r′(xr′) < F14,r(xr), where xr′ and
xr are the roots of K(A1) − F14,r′(A1) and K(A1) − F14,r(A1) respectively. Since
F13,r′(A1)− F14,r(A1) < F13,r(A1)− F14,r(A1), A2,r > A2,r,r′ . Similarly, F13,r′(A1)−
F14,r′(A1) > F13,r′(A1) − F14,r(A1) implies that A2,r,r′ > A2,r′ . Therefore, A2 is
decreasing in r. In the case of N , the proof is analogous to to the case of r and it
is omitted here. 
Proposition 3.2.3 states that either a larger discount rate r or a larger number of
agents N implies more harvest of x2, the prey. Since x2 is the food source of x1, it
reduces the biomass of x1, which in turn increases the costs of each agent harvesting
x1. As a result, agents may have less incentive to harvest larger amounts of x1. On
the other hand, mathematically, there exist two groups of parameters such that
one leads A1 to increase in either r or N and the other leads to the opposite. For
example, suppose that r = 0.2, α1 = −1.3, α2 = 4, β1 = 0.25, β2 = 0.1, γ1 = −1,
γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, p1 = 0.3, p2 = 1, c1 = 0.45, c2 = 1 and N = 2,
it can be derived numerically that A1 = 0.21356 and A2 = 0.48059. On the other
hand, if r = 0.5 while all other parameters remain the same, then A1 = 0.21753
and A2 = 0.2746. Note that in this case, x1 is more profitable and costly than x2.
Even though agents expect that the food resource of x1, i.e., x2, is reduced, they
still harvest less x1 and therefore A1 decreases. This result also holds for N ; even
though more agents join the game, each agent still harvest less x1. On the other
hand, in the case of σj, γj and pj, the following proposition can be put forward:
Proposition 3.2.4. (Predatory Case) A1 and A2 are both decreasing in γ2 as well
as A1 and A2 is decreasing and increasing in γ1, respectively. In the case of σj, for
a fixed σ2, A1 and A2 are decreasing in σ1. On the other hand, for a fixed σ1, A1 is
increasing and A2 is decreasing in σ2. In the case of p1, A1 and A2 are decreasing
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in p1.
Proof. The proof of this result is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2.3. 
In the case of σj, a larger σ1 implies a greater impact of x1 in the future and
therefore each agent tends to harvest more x1. Since less x1 leads the biomass of
x2 to increase, agents will harvest more x2 simultaneously. On the other hand, an
increasing σ2 leads agents to harvest more x2 and leads x1 to have a lesser resource
of food. Hence agents tend to harvest less x1. In the case of γ1, a larger −γ1 leads
x1 to increase and then x2 is decreasing due to an increased stock of predators. It
is interesting that this result shows that fishery agents harvest less x1 and more x2.
The interpretation is that agents may observe a lower biomass of x2 in the future
and hence catch more x2 now. This leads x1 to decrease in the future due to a lack
of food resources and therefore agents harvest less x1. On the other side, a larger γ2
causes x2 to decrease, while x1 is decreasing since it is the predator. Agents expect
lower stock of both species in the future and therefore, they catch more x1 and x2
now. In the case of p1, a higher p1 leads agents to benefit less from x1. They will
need to harvest more x1 to maintain the same level of utility. On the other hand,
this leads the biomass of x2 to increase and they also tend to harvest more x2. In
the case of cj and p2, however, it is not possible to give a definitive answer as to
how agents change their strategies and how those parameters affect the fixed points
are not clear. It can also been seen that the harvest of x2, the prey, is increasing in
each parameter, which may cause x1 to decrease in the future. The results of this
section have been organised into the following tables, where the first and second
tables represent the competitive and predatory-prey cases, respectively.
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Parameters Fixed Points
r or N A1 and A2 are decreasing.
pj, βj or σj Aj is decreasing and Aj′ is increasing.
cj or γj Aj is increasing and Aj′ is decreasing.
Table 3.1: Competitive Case
Parameters Fixed Points
r or N A2 is decreasing.
γ1 A1 is decreasing and A2 is increasing.
p1 or γ2 A1 and A2 are decreasing.
σ1 A1 and A2 are decreasing.
σ2 A1 is increasing and A2 is decreasing.
Table 3.2: Predator-Prey Case
3.3. The case of single-species restricted fisheries
In this section, without loss of generality, it is supposed that there are two agents,
say agent 1 and agent 2, and agent i is only allowed to harvest species xi. This
assumption is realistic given that fishery agents could harvest via different fishing
vessels and techniques. Datta and Mirman (1999) also considered this case and
argue that this situation could occur, see [?]. In [?], the fishery agents represent
different countries which have different consumption characteristics and species
preferences. The objective functional for i is defined by
max
ui
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[√
ui(t)√
pi
− ciui(t)√
xi(t)
]
dt |x1(0) = x10, x2(0) = x20
}
, (3.24)
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and state equations are given by
dxi(t) =
{
xi(t)
[
αi√
xi(t)
− βi − γi
√
xi′(t)
xi(t)
]
− ui(t)
}
dt+ σixi(t)dWi(t),
dxi′(t) =
{
xi′(t)
[
αi′√
xi′(t)
− βi′ − γi′
√
xi(t)
xi′(t)
]
− ui′(t)
}
dt+ σi′xi′(t)dWi′(t).
(3.25)
As before, the finite horizon approximation approach will be applied to solve this
problem. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for the finite time horizon ap-
proximation for agents i = 1, 2 is given by
rV1(t, x1, x2;T )− ∂
∂t
V1(t, x1, x2;T )
= max
u1
{√
u1√
p1
− c1u1√
x1
+
∂
∂x1
V1(t, x1, x2;T ) (α1
√
x1 − β1x1 − γ1√x1x2 − u1)
+
∂
∂x2
V1(t, x1, x2;T ) (α2
√
x2 − β2x2 − γ2√x1x2 − u∗2)
+
σ21x
2
1
2
∂2
∂x21
V1(t, x1, x2;T ) +
σ22x
2
2
2
∂2
∂x22
V1(t, x1, x2;T )
}
(3.26)
and
rV2(t, x1, x2;T )− ∂
∂t
V2(t, x1, x2;T )
= max
u2
{√
u2√
p2
− c2u2√
x2
+
∂
∂x2
V2(t, x1, x2;T ) (α2
√
x2 − β2x2 − γ2√x1x2 − u2)
+
∂
∂x1
V2(t, x1, x2;T ) (α1
√
x1 − β1x1 − γ1√x1x2 − u∗1)
+
σ21x
2
1
2
∂2
∂x21
V2(t, x1, x2;T ) +
σ22x
2
2
2
∂2
∂x22
V2(t, x1, x2;T )
}
.
(3.27)
77
Necessary conditions for maximizing the RHS of equation (3.26) and (3.27) are
ui =
1
4pi
1[
ci√
xi
+ ∂
∂xi
Vi(t, xi, xi′ ;T )
]2 (3.28)
for (i, i′) = (1, 2) and (2, 1). Substituting equation (4.28) into equation (4.26) and
(4.27), results in a system of PDE’s
rV1(t, x1, x2;T )− ∂
∂t
V1(t, x1, x2;T )
=
1
2p1
[
c1√
x1
+ ∂
∂x1
V1(t, x1, x2;T )
] − c1
4p1
√
x1
[
c1√
x1
+ ∂
∂x1
V1(t, x1, x2;T )
]2
+
∂
∂x1
V1(t, x1, x2;T )

α1
√
x1 − β1x1 − γ1√x1x2 − 1
4p1
[
c1√
x1
+ ∂
∂x1
V1(t, x1, x2;T )
]2


+
∂
∂x2
V1(t, x1, x2;T )

α2
√
x2 − β2x2 − γ2√x1x2 − 1
4p2
[
c2√
x2
+ ∂
∂x2
V2(t, x1, x2;T )
]2


+
σ21x
2
1
2
∂2
∂x21
V1(t, x1, x2;T ) +
σ22x
2
2
2
∂2
∂x22
V1(t, x1, x2;T )
(3.29)
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and
rV2(t, x1, x2;T )− ∂
∂t
V2(t, x1, x2;T )
=
1
2p2
[
c2√
x2
+ ∂
∂x2
V2(t, x1, x2;T )
] − c2
4p2
√
x2
[
c2√
x2
+ ∂
∂x2
V2(t, x1, x2;T )
]2
+
∂
∂x2
V2(t, x1, x2;T )

α2
√
x2 − β2x2 − γ2√x1x2 − 1
4p2
[
c2√
x2
+ ∂
∂x2
V2(t, x1, x2;T )
]2


+
∂
∂x1
V2(t, x1, x2;T )

α1
√
x1 − β1x1 − γ1√x1x2 − 1
4p1
[
c1√
x1
+ ∂
∂x1
V1(t, x1, x2;T )
]2


+
σ21x
2
1
2
∂2
∂x21
V2(t, x1, x2;T ) +
σ22x
2
2
2
∂2
∂x22
V2(t, x1, x2;T )
(3.30)
with boundary conditions
V1(T, x1, x2;T ) = 0 (3.31)
V2(T, x1, x2;T ) = 0 (3.32)
As before, a sophisticated guess will be made with regard to the functional form of
the solution for equations (3.29), (3.30), (3.31) and (3.32)
V1(t, x1, x2;T ) = A1(t)
√
x1 + A2(t)
√
x2 + A3(t)
V2(t, x1, x2;T ) = B1(t)
√
x1 +B2(t)
√
x2 +B3(t).
Substituting these into equations (3.29) and (3.30) generates a system of ordinary
differential equations. To apply the finite horizon approximation approach, it is then
necessary to derive the fixed points and to solve the resulting system of polynomials.
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The polynomial system is
k1A
3
1 +
(
4c1k1 +
γ2A2
2
)
A21 +
(
4c21k1 −
1
2p1
+ 2c1γ2A2
)
A1 + 2c
2
1γ2A2 −
c1
p1
= 0[
k2 +
1
2p2 (2c2 +B2)
2
]
A2 +
γ1A1
2
= 0
rA3 − α1A1
2
− α2A2
2
= 0[
k1 +
1
2p1 (2c1 + A1)
2
]
B1 +
γ2B2
2
= 0
k2B
3
2 +
(
4c2k2 +
γ1B1
2
)
B22 +
(
4c22k2 −
1
2p2
+ 2c2γ1B1
)
B2 + 2c
2
2γ1B1 −
c2
p2
= 0
rB3 − α1B1
2
− α2B2
2
= 0
(3.33)
Economically, in the case of a two species competitive system, it would be expected
that A1 and B2 will be positive and A2 and B1 will be negative. The reason for this
is that agent i only benefits from species xi. On the other hand, a greater biomass
of xi′ implies a lower biomass of xi. In the case of a predator-prey system, both
A1 and A2 are positive, while B1 is negative and B2 is positive. The interpretation
of this is that an increase in the biomass of x2 leads the biomass of x1 to increase,
which therefore implies that agent 1 will also benefit from x2. In system (3.33), the
second equation is substituted into the first equation and the third equation into
the fourth, with the following results:
[
k1 +
γ2f (B2)
2
]
A31+[4c1k1 + 2c1γ2f (B2)]A
2
1+
[
4c21k1 −
1
2p1
+ 2c21γ2f (B2)
]
A1− c1
p1
= 0
(3.34)
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and
[
k2 +
γ1g (A1)
2
]
B32+[4c2k2 + 2c2γ1g (A1)]B
2
2+
[
4c22k2 −
1
2p2
+ 2c22γ1g (A1)
]
B2− c2
p2
= 0
(3.35)
where
f (B2) = − γ1p2 (2c2 +B2)
2
2k2p2 (2c2 +B2)
2 + 1
g (A1) = − γ2p1 (2c1 + A1)
2
2k1p1 (2c1 + A1)
2 + 1
This gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3.1. Under the assumption that
4c2jk1k2pj − c2jpjγ1γ2 − 2kj′ ≥ 0
hold for (j, j′) = (1, 2) and (2, 1), equation (3.34) and (3.35) have a unique positive
pair of solutions.
Proof. The condition with j = 1 implies that equation (3.34) has a positive and
unique root. Similarly, when j = 2, the condition leads equation (3.35) to have a
positive and unique root. Note that, in the case of a two species competitive system,
it is possible to construct two increasing sequences and each sequence has an upper
boundary due to this condition. On the other hand, in the case of a predator-prey
system, one of these two sequences will increase with an upper bound while the
other will decrease with a lower bound. Hence, the proof of this result is analogous
to the proof of Proposition 3.1.1. 
The optimal utility and optimal control obtained in the setup of this section will
now be compared with the optimal utility from the previous section. Starting with
81
the case of a two species competitive system: Equations (3.13) and (3.34), consist
of cubic polynomials. Moreover, the coefficients of A31, A
2
1 and A1 in equation (3.13)
are greater than those in equation (3.34). On the other hand,
0 > 2c21γ2A2 −
3c1
8p1
> 2c21γ2A2 −
c1
p1
> − c1
p1
(3.36)
Similar properties hold for equations (3.14) and (3.35). It can be proved that
the solutions for equation (3.13) and (3.14) are less in value than the solutions of
equation (3.34) and (3.35). On the other hand, the optimal controls for agent 1 and
2 with restriction are given by
ur∗1 =
x1
p1 (2c1 + Ar1)
2
ur∗2 =
x2
p2 (2c2 +Br2)
2
while without any restriction they are
unr∗i =
9xi
8pi (2ci + Anri )
2 , i = 1, 2.
Since Anr1 ≤ Ar1 and Anr2 ≤ Br2, agent i with restriction harvests less than without
restriction. The interpretation of this is that overexploitation of xi leads xi′ to
increase in biomass. This will therefore reduce the biomass of xi and increase the
utility of agent i′. On the other hand, without any restriction, agents harvest both
species and do not worry about the biomass of xi′ . This may cause one of the
species to become extinct. On the other hand, it can be seen that if the following
inequalities hold
Ar1 − Anr1
Anr2 − Ar2
√
x1 +
Ar3 − Anr3
Anr2 − Ar2
≥ √x2 ≥ B
r
1 − Anr1
Anr2 −Br2
√
x1 +
Br3 − Anr3
Anr2 −Br2
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then agents obtain more utility in the case of restriction than the case of competition.
In the case of a predator-prey system, however, the idea of comparing each
coefficient in equation (3.13) and (3.14) to (3.34) and (3.35) cannot be applied.
Economically, it would be expected that agent 2 would prefer to harvest more x2.
The reason for this is that the biomass of x1 is increasing if agent 2 harvests less
x2, which therefore implies that agent 1 benefits more from x1. On the other hand,
even though agent 2 harvests less x2 to maintain a sustainable biomass of x2, x1
still hunts for x2, causing a reduction in the biomass of x2. In this case, agent 2
not only competes with agent 1 but also species x1. The situation is that if agent
2 harvests more x2 and causes x2 become extinct, then x1 will become extinct in
the future. This causes agent 2 to have more bargaining power and agent 1 may be
forced to cooperate.
3.4. The case of maximizing joint utility
In this section, it is proposed that all agents are allowed to cooperate. The idea is
then to derive the optimal joint utility function. Since the model developed above is
symmetric, it is natural to assume that each agent shares the catch equally among
all members. The joint objective functional is given by
max
v1,v2
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rt
2∑
j=1
[√
vj(t)√
pj
− cj√
xj
vj(t)
]
dt |x1(0) = x10, x2(0) = x20
}
(3.37)
where
vj(t) =
N∑
i=1
uji (t), j = 1, 2
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and the state equations are given by
dx1(t) =
{
x1(t)
[
α1√
x1(t)
− β1 − γ1
√
x2(t)
x1(t)
]
− v1(t)
}
dt+ σ1x1(t)dW1(t)
dx2(t) =
{
x2(t)
[
α2√
x2(t)
− β2 − γ2
√
x1(t)
x2(t)
]
− v2(t)
}
dt+ σ2x2(t)dW2(t).
(3.38)
It can be seen that the model is consistent with the case N = 1. Therefore, the
optimal controls and joint utility function can easily be derived from equation (3.18)
and (3.19). Furthermore, the optimal controls can be obtained by Proposition 3.2.1.
On the other hand, the aggregate amount of harvest for the case of cooperation is
less than that for the case of competition. This gives rise to a new proposition:
Proposition 3.4.1. In the case of a two species competitive system, if either con-
dition (1) or (2) in Proposition 3.1.1 and the condition in Proposition 3.3.1 hold,
then equation (3.13) and (3.14) under N = 1 has a pair of positive and unique fixed
points. On the other hand, in the case of a predator-prey system, the conditions in
Proposition 3.1.2 and Proposition 3.3.1 guarantees that equation (3.13) and (3.14)
under N = 1 has a pair of positive roots.
Proof. The proof of this result is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.1.1 and
Proposition 3.1.2. 
Suppose that (Ac1, A
c
2) denotes the fixed points for the case of cooperation and
(Anc1 , A
nc
2 ) denotes the fixed point for the case of competition. This gives
xj
pj
(
2cj + Acj
)2 ≤ xj
pj
(
2cj + Ancj
)2 ≤ N (2N − 1)2 xj
pjN3
(
2cj + Ancj
)2 (3.39)
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since (2N−1)
2
N2
≥ 1. Clark (2006) highlighted several methods to reduce the impact
on the ecological system and one of these is cooperation between agents, see [?],
Chapter 1. It can be seen in inequality (3.39) that, in the case of cooperation, the
impact on the ecological system is less than under competition, i.e., the aggregate
amount of harvest under cooperation is lower than under competition. The next
section shows an example where this relationship can be reversed, if the system is
predator-prey, rather than competitive.
3.5. Some numerical results
This section will present some numerical results from the equations generated
above. An iterative method will be applied in order to derive a positive pair of
solutions to equation (3.13) and (3.14), as well as equation (3.34) and (3.35). The
concept is to start with a sufficiently large discretization of the set of potential values
for A1 i.e. {Ai1 |i = 0, ..., n}. Substituting each Ai1 into equation (3.14) and solving it
numerically by Newton’s method gives {Ai2 |i = 0, ..., n}. Each pair (Ai1, Ai2) is then
examined via equation (3.13) in order to identify which Am1 leads equation (3.13) to
have a minimum. The pair (Am1 , A
m
2 ) are then chosen as an approximation of the
positive pair of solutions. Note that in the proof of Proposition 4.1.1, Proposition
4.3.1 and Proposition 3.4.1, it can be seen that this technique will leads Ai1 and A
i
2
to be consistent with the property of the sequences we have constructed in those
proofs.
Starting with the case of a two species competitive system and assuming that
the coefficients for the ecological system are given by α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1, β1 = 0.6,
β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15 and σ2 = 0.55. For the agents it
is assumed that r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 1.3 and N =
2. This case results in Figures 3.3 to 3.12 in Graphical Illustration. Note that
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these parameters satisfy Condition (1) in Proposition 3.1.1 and the condition in
Proposition 3.3.1. This guarantees that fixed points exist. Under the coefficients
chosen, Anr1 = A
nc
1 ≈ 0.030531, Anr2 = Anc2 ≈ 0.051864, Anr3 = Anc3 ≈ 0.22889, Ar1 ≈
0.38468, Ar2 ≈ −0.31754, Ar3 ≈ 0.45635, Br1 ≈ −0.306, Br2 ≈ 0.4615, Br3 ≈ 0.15926,
Ac1 ≈ 0.078766, Ac2 ≈ 0.14608 and Ac3 ≈ 0.62119. Figure 3.3 represents the optimal
utility function without any restriction for each agent. It can be seen that optimal
utility is increasing as either x1 or x2 is increasing. This is reasonable because agents
benefit from both species. On the other hand, in Figure 3.4, agent 1 is bound to
harvest x2 and since x2 competes with x1, a larger x2 implies a lower optimal utility.
Similarly, in Figure 3.5, agent 2 receives less utility if x1 is larger. The optimal joint
utility function is presented in Figure 3.6 while Figure 3.7 displays the difference
between the optimal joint utility function and the sum of the utility functions in
competition. From the analysis in section 5, if agents observe that the biomass of
each species satisfies
0.9585
√
x1 − 0.61575 ≥ √x2 ≥ 0.82154√x1 − 0.16998,
they may prefer the restricted case because they obtain more benefits than under the
competitive regime. Figure 3.8 and 3.9 represent the difference of the optimal utility
functions between restriction and competition for agent 1 and 2 respectively. As an
approximation to an infinite time horizon, this uses a finite time horizon of T = 50.
The initial states are given by the fixed points of the deterministic ecological system,
see section 3.1. In this case, they are x10 = 0.38028 and x20 = 1.0678. In the case
of no restriction, it can be seen that in Figure 3.10, x1 is decreasing around x10 and
then increasing until it converges to around 2.89. On the other hand, x2 is decreasing
and tends to 0.09, which means that x2 may become extinct relatively easily. The
interpretation of this is that since x2 is more profitable and costs less than x1, the
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likelihood of x2 becoming extinct is quite large. Since x2 cannot compete with x1,
the biomass of x1 is increasing. On the other hand, if each agent is restricted, it
can be observed from from Figure 3.11 that the expectations of both species are
increasing and converge to around 3.35 and 0.35, respectively. In the case of the
optimal joint utility function, both species survive. It can be seen in Figure 3.12
that x1 converges to around 3.30 and x2 tends to around 0.30. In order to prevent
over-exploitation of resources, some restriction may be necessary. In this case, either
forcing fisheries to fish a single species or cooperation between the fisheries leads
both species to maintain a sustainable biomass.
Now moving to the case of a predator prey system: Assuming that that α1 = −1.3,
α2 = 4, γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15 and σ2 = 0.55. For the agents it is assumed
that r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 2 and N = 2. Figures 3.13 to 3.22 in
the Graphical Illustration relate to this case. It can be computed numerically that
Anr1 = A
nc
1 ≈ 0.015258, Anr2 = Anc2 ≈ 0.08893, Anr3 = Anc3 ≈ 0.83971, Ar1 ≈ 0.10726,
Ar2 ≈ 0.19463, Ar3 ≈ 1.5977, Br1 ≈ −0.067684, Br2 ≈ 0.045, Br3 ≈ 0.66997, Ac1 ≈
0.039422, Ac2 ≈ 0.23986 and Ac3 ≈ 2.2705. Note that x1 is more profitable and less
costly than x2 due to those parameters. For instance, if sharks are harvested for their
fins this causes the population of sharks to decline. On the other hand, the biomass
of other species hunted by sharks increases because the biomass of sharks declines.
This clearly has a great effect on the ecological system. In Figure 3.13, it can be seen
that even though the parameters selected cause x1 to be more profitable and less
costly than x2, each agent benefits more from x2 than x1. This numerical example
shows that the benefit from the profitable predator might not be as high as expected.
On the other hand, in Figure 3.14, agent 1 obtains higher utility than without any
restriction. The difference between the two utility functions is presented in Figure
3.18. The utility function in the case where agent 2 is allowed to harvest only x2 is
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presented in Figure 3.15. It can be seen in Figure 3.19 that agent 2 obtains lower
utility than under the unrestricted competition condition. This may lead agent 2 to
have less incentive to be restricted. The case of cooperation is presented in figure
3.16 and each agent obtains higher utility than under competitive conditions, which
was expected, see Figure 3.17. Note that a larger x1 in cooperation than under
competition.
The graphs relating to the ecological system for each case are presented in Figures
3.20, 3.21 and 3.22. As initial values used are taken from the fixed points of the
deterministic ecological system, in this numerical example they are given by x10 =
32.653 and x20 = 2.0864. We choose T = 500 was chosen for each case. In Figure
3.20, 3.21 and 3.22, it can be seen that x1 is decreasing and x2 is increasing at the
beginning. Since x1 has more resources of food, it is increasing and therefore causes
x2 to decrease by predation. However, they are both decreasing around t = 30
and both tend to 0, which means that both x1 and x2 become extinct. Although
Figures 3.20, 3.21 and 3.22 are similar, the rate of convergence to zero is different.
In the case of competition, x1 and x2 converge to zero with a significantly lower
rate. It can be seen that both species survive longer when agents compete with
each other. Once x2 becomes extinct, x1 will soon be extinct. It can be seen that
both cooperation and restriction are not efficient in a predator-prey system and
cause both species to become extinct earlier than in the case of competition.
3.6. Conclusions
The author has presented a continuous time game theoretic model of a two
species fishery with ecological interaction and uncertainty. This line of research
extends and combines previous studies of two species fishery models in discrete
time with no uncertainty by Andereson (1975) [?] and Quirk and Smith (1977) [?]
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as well as the line of stochastic differential game models developed by Hofbauer
and Sigmund (1998) [?] and Jorgensen and Yeung (1996) [?] which focuses on one
species fisheries. There is sufficient motivation for either of the two research lines,
but it is only by combining them that a more realistic model containing uncertainty,
continuous time and ecological aspects can be obtained. The new model is richer,
but also mathematically more complex. It has been shown that, under appropriate
assumptions, this model has a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium and various
formulas and equations have been derived which characterize it. It was possible to
determine a semi- analytic solution, by which it is meant that an analytic form of
the solution has been derived, but it is necessary to numerically calculate certain
parameters within it. The comparative statics of the model have been discussed,
together with the numerical results, and an economic interpretation has been given.
The different cases of competitive, restricted and cooperative fisheries management
have been discussed, along with the differences in their impacts on the ecological
system. According to the numerical example, it can be seen from the perspective of
conservation that it is necessary to introduce some fishery policies. Therefore, the
next chapter will introduce the concept of maximum sustainable yield.
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Graphical Illustration
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Figure 3.1: Stable Coexistence Case
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Figure 3.2: Bistable Case
90
Figure 3.3: Optimal utility function in competition under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1, β1 = 0.6,
β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 1.65,
c1 = 1.45, c2 = 1.3 and N = 2
Figure 3.4: Optimal utility function with restriction for agent 1 under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1,
β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85,
p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45 and c2 = 1.3
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Figure 3.5: Optimal utility function with restriction for agent 2 under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1,
β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85,
p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45 and c2 = 1.3
Figure 3.6: Optimal joint utility function under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1, β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.55,
γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 1.3
and N = 2
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Figure 3.7: Difference of optimal joint utility function and the sum of utility functions
in competition under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1, β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15,
σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 1.3 and N = 2
Figure 3.8: Difference of optimal utility functions between restriction and competition
for agent 1 under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1, β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15,
σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 1.3 and N = 2
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Figure 3.9: Difference of optimal utility functions between restriction and competition
for agent 2 under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1, β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15,
σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 1.3 and N = 2
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Figure 3.10: Means of corresponding states for competition under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1,
β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85,
p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 1.3, N = 2 and T = 50
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Figure 3.11: Means of corresponding states with restriction under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1,
β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85,
p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 1.3 and T = 50
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Figure 3.12: Means of corresponding states for the case of optimal joint utility function
under α1 = 1.3, α2 = 1, β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.55, γ1 = 0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55,
r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 1.65, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 1.3 and T = 50
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Figure 3.13: Optimal utility function in competition under α1 = −1.3, α2 = 4, γ1 =
−0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 2 and
N = 2
Figure 3.14: Optimal utility function with restriction for agent 1 under α1 = −1.3,
α2 = 4, γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45,
c2 = 2 and N = 2
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Figure 3.15: Optimal utility function with restriction for agent 2 under α1 = −1.3,
α2 = 4, γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45
and c2 = 2
Figure 3.16: Optimal joint utility function under α1 = −1.3, α2 = 4, γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7,
σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45 and c2 = 2
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Figure 3.17: Difference of optimal joint utility function and the sum of utility functions
in competition under α1 = −1.3, α2 = 4, γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55,
r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 2 and N = 2
Figure 3.18: Difference of optimal utility functions between restriction and competition
for agent 1 under α1 = −1.3, α2 = 4, γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2,
p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 2 and N = 2
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Figure 3.19: Difference of optimal utility functions between restriction and competition
for agent 2 under α1 = −1.3, α2 = 4, γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2,
p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 2 and N = 2
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Figure 3.20: Means of corresponding states for competition under α1 = −1.3, α2 = 4,
γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 2,
N = 2 and T = 500
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Figure 3.21: Means of corresponding states with restriction under α1 = −1.3, α2 = 4,
γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85, p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 2,
N = 2 and T = 500
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Figure 3.22: Means of corresponding states for the case of optimal joint utility function
under α1 = −1.3, α2 = 4, γ1 = −0.9, γ2 = 0.7, σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = 0.55, r = 0.2, p1 = 1.85,
p2 = 3, c1 = 1.45, c2 = 2, N = 2 and T = 500
Chapter 4
Sustainable Yields in Fisheries:
Uncertainty, Risk-Aversion and
Mean-Variance Analysis
Maximum sustainable yield models were among the first mathematical models
applied to fishery economics and are now well established, see for example Clark
(2006) [?]. While models such as the Schaefer model (1957) [?], which takes
economic considerations such as profit taking into account, are seen as more realistic
than maximum sustainable yield models, the latter are still used as a benchmark,
in particular when it comes to policy implications. Evidence of this can be found
in articles by Maundner (2002) [?], Jacobson et al. (2002) [?] and Roughgarden
and Smith (1996) [?]. Sustainability as a concept, of course, has had somewhat of a
renaissance in recent years, as people rethink their approaches to the environment,
renewable resources and wildlife conservation. With the exception of Bousquet et
al. (2008) [?], models taking maximal (optimal) sustainable yield as their primary
objective have only been considered in a deterministic framework. The analysis in
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this case is very simple. The underlying deterministic logistic growth dynamic with
constant harvesting effort u is given by
x′(t) = κx(t) (θ − x(t))− qux(t). (4.1)
Without adopting any fishing effort, (4.1) has two fixed points, i.e., 0 and θ. In
the case of 0, it represents the situation where the species becomes extinct. On the
other hand, the fixed points θ represents the case of an ecological equilibrium. The
non-zero fixed point can be easily computed, in fact
x(∞, u) = θ − qu
κ
, (4.2)
and the effort level u that maximizes this fixed point is called the maximum sus-
tainable yield effort, here
u∗ =
θκ
2q
. (4.3)
The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is then given as MSY = qu∗x(∞, u∗).
Now, it is clearly the case that fish populations do not grow deterministically,
but are affected by random sources which can be caused either environmentally,
e.g., climate change, or ecologically, e.g., availability of food sources or existence of
predators. The issue that fish populations are affected by uncertainty was taken
up in the previous Chapter. In this Chapter, the classical deterministic model
has been extended by adding a level dependent diffusion term to equation (4.1).
The dynamics are then governed by a stochastic differential equation and fixed
points no longer exist, therefore the classical notion of maximum sustainable yield
does not make sense in this context. It was shown, however, that the general
concept of sustainability and maximization can be carried over to this more realistic
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setup. Firstly, while stochastic differential equations seldom admit fixed points,
they often admit so-called stable or equilibrium distributions. For the case of the
fishery, this would mean that, once this distribution is reached, fish numbers can
still fluctuate stochastically, but the underlying distribution no longer changes over
time. The equilibrium distribution of a stochastic differential equation of type (4.1)
is nowadays, in principle, well understood. The non-equilibrium distribution has
only been computed very recently by Yang and Ewald (2008) [?] and may play a
role in future work. Fisheries may now want to maximize certain functionals that
depend on this equilibrium distribution. The first such functional that comes to
mind is the expected value of the equilibrium distribution, leading to the concept
of maximum expected sustainable yield, and this will be discussed in section 4.3. A
detailed study will be made of the effect of uncertainty on the harvesting behaviour
of the fishery.
In reality, it is well known that economic agents behave in a risk averse fashion
and act in such a way as to trade-off between expectation and risk. It is natural
to assume that fisheries are, in general, willing to accept a lower expected yield in
turn for a lower level of risk. This aspect is taken into account in section 4.4 and
a linear combination of expected value and variance of the equilibrium distribution
of (4.1) is used as a performance measure. The problem of maximizing expected
yield is also studied under a variance constraint, as well as minimizing variance, e.g.
risk, under an expected sustainable yield constraint. The author and his supervisor
refer to this approach as Mean-Variance Analysis of Sustainable Fisheries, since it
essentially relates to aspects studied by Markowitz (1952) [?],which it is well known
led to a revolution in finance and a Nobel prize.
This chapter is related to the article by Bousquet et al. (2008) [?] who also
consider sustainable yields in a stochastic dynamic environment, but consider dis-
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crete time, and do not reflect on issues such as risk aversion. While the continu-
ous time setup is considered more realistic by the author, it must be emphasized
that, mathematically, it is no more difficult. In fact, the available results on the
equilibrium distributions of continuous time diffusions shorten the mathematical
exposition significantly and allow it to appear more elegant in places, the latter,
of course, being a matter of taste. Models in continuous time with the same or
similar underlying diffusion processes to this thesis have been considered by various
authors. However, these authors have not considered sustainability as the primary
objective of the fishery. The aspect of sustainability is, for example, considered
in Pindyck (1984) [?], but only in the way that the equilibrium distribution under
profit maximizing strategies is computed, which of course is conceptually different
than optimization of sustainable yields. Pindyck also assumes that the firms are
risk neutral. Further significant contributions along the line taken by Pindyck have
been made by Lande et al. (1995) [?], Alvarez and Schlepp (1998) [?] as well as
Shah and Sharma (2003) [?]. It is also worth mentioning recent work by Hartman
[?] in this field. He does, however, focus on profit maximization, and sustainable
yields or equilibrium distributions do not play any role in this work. The author
considers that this thesis makes new conceptual contributions to the current body
of work, not only with respect to sustainable yields, but also and in particular with
respect to the issue of risk aversion and mean-variance analysis.
4.1. The Model
It is assumed that, without interference by the fishery, the total mass of the fish
population follows the stochastic logistic growth dynamic
dx(t) = [κx(t) (θ − x(t))] dt+ σx(t)dW (t), (4.4)
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with κ, θ and σ positive constants. This dynamic is basically the classical determin-
istic logistic growth dynamic, extended by a level dependent diffusion term. The
expression dW (t) represents the increment of a Brownian motion, e.g., a continuous
time random walk. Equation (4.4) is, on the other hand, a geometric mean reverting
process. For a full specification of (4.1) it is necessary to apply an initial condition
x(0) = x0 and it is assumed that x0 > 0. Interestingly the precise value of x0 will
not play a role in the following sections. Given that the fishery harvests the fish
following a constant effort strategy u, the actual mass rate of fish harvested is then
assumed to be qux(t), where q > 0 denotes an efficiency parameter. The dynamic
for the fish population is then given by
dx(t) = [κx(t) (θ − x(t))− qux(t)] dt+ σx(t)dW (t), (4.5)
which is equivalent to
dx(t) = κx(t)
({
θ − qu
κ
}
− x(t)
)
dt+ σx(t)dW (t). (4.6)
This has the same dynamic structure as (4.4), with the mean reverting parameter
θ replaced by θ − qu
κ
. Note that the fishing effort influences the mean reversion
parameter, and hence also the long term expectation and variance of this process,
which will be discussed in the following section. Be warned at this point though,
that the long term expectation does not coincide with the mean reversion parameter,
Merton (1975) [?] identified this feature and called it expectation bias. It will be
indicated in Chapter 5 that geometric mean reversion appears in various economic
and biological models. For example, in a stochastic Solow model, the process
appears as an interest rate process in the work of Merton.
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4.2. Sustainability and Equilibrium distribution
The stochastic differential equation (4.6) does not have any fixed point other than
0 and the deterministic equilibrium analysis does not apply. Clearly at each point in
time, x(t) is random, and convergence and asymptotic behaviour then needs to be
understood in terms of probabilities and distribution. Under regularity conditions
which are outlined in Malliaris and Brock (1982) [?], page 106, the process x(t)
indeed converges in distribution to a random variable and one formally writes
lim
t→∞
x(t) =: x(∞). (4.7)
The distribution of x(∞) is then called the equilibrium distribution of (4.6). It is, in
principle, possible to conclude from Merton’s work, that under the condition 2κθ >
σ2 + 2qu the equilibrium distribution exists; it is independent of the starting value
and essentially represents a Gamma distribution. This requires some relabeling of
coefficients and transformations, as Merton’s model is set up as a macro economic
growth model. Alternatively, a simple derivation of the equilibrium distribution
can be found in Ewald and Yang (2007) [?], equation (25). The author and his
supervisor conclude the following:
Proposition 4.2.1. Under the assumption 2κθ > σ2 + 2qu the fish population
reaches equilibrium distribution. This density function is given by
ρ(x) =


bγ
Γ(γ)
xγ−1e−bx x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
with coefficients γ = 2(κθ−qu)
σ2
− 1 and b = 2κ
σ2
.
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If the condition 2κθ > σ2 + 2qu is not satisfied, there is a positive probability that
the population is driven to extinction. Clearly, harvesting efforts which are likely
to cause extinction are considered to be non-sustainable. In terms of the harvesting
effort, this gives the following sustainability condition
0 ≤ u < 2κθ − σ
2
2q
. (4.8)
It is worthwhile to note, that this sustainability condition becomes more restrictive,
the higher the uncertainty parameter σ is, which of course makes sense. It is also
assumed that harvesting effort is non-negative. Condition (4.8) becomes meaning-
less unless we assume 2κθ > σ2, a standard condition which will be assumed from
now on. This assumption appears repeatedly in other mean reverting models; see,
for example, Alos and Ewald (2008) [?]. In reality it may of course be possible
that the condition 2κθ > σ2 is not satisfied. Reasons for this may be extremely
high uncertainty, caused by factors such as global warming, pollution etc.. or low
mean reversion speeds, e.g. low values of κ, which can be found in populations
which reproduce at a very slow rate, for example whales or sharks. If this is the
case, there is a positive probability that the population will die out, even if a zero
harvesting policy is adopted.
4.3. Maximum expected sustainable yield
If the fishing effort u satisfies the sustainability condition (4.8), the corresponding
expected sustainable yield (ESY) from this effort is defined as
ESY (u) = quE(x(∞, u)) = qu
∫ ∞
0
xρ(x, u)dx, (4.9)
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where u has been used as an additional argument in the notation to emphasize
the fact that the equilibrium distribution of (4.6) depends on u. The objective in
this section is to determine the value of u that maximises the expected sustainable
yield. As u is assumed to be sustainable 2 (κθ − qu) > σ2 and it is concluded from
Ewald and Yang (2007) [?], equation (31), that the first moment of the equilibrium
distribution of (4.6) is given by
E {x (∞)} = κθ − qu
κ
− σ
2
2κ
. (4.10)
The maximum expected sustainable yield (MESY) and the maximizing fishing effort
u∗ can then be derived by computing the maximizer of
ESY (u) = quE {x (∞, u)} = κθqu− q
2u2
κ
− σ
2qu
2κ
. (4.11)
The latter is very easy as (4.11) merely presents a quadratic equation in u. The
optimal fishing effort is given by
u∗ =
2κθ − σ2
4q
, (4.12)
and the expected maximum sustainable yield is obtained by substitution as
MESY =
(
θq − σ
2q
2κ
)
2κθ − σ2
4q
− (2κθ − σ
2)
2
16κ
=
(2κθ − σ2)2
16κ
.
(4.13)
Note that (4.12) indeed satisfies the sustainability condition (4.8). Also note that for
σ = 0 this expression coincides with expression (4.3). This of course is expected, as
the case σ = 0 corresponds to the deterministic setup reviewed in the introduction
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of this Chapter. However, expression (4.12) was derived using the equilibrium dis-
tribution, and the fact that in the limit case σ = 0 the deterministic expression can
be derived: this implies a certain regularity property of the equilibrium distribution.
It is not difficult to see, that MESY is decreasing in σ. Indeed we have
∂
∂σ
qu∗E {x (∞)} = −σ (2κθ − σ
2)
4κ
< 0
for σ2 < 2κθ, which is implied by the sustainability condition. Fisheries or fishery
agencies whose objective it is to guarantee sustainability need to take this very
carefully into account. On the other hand, it can easily be shown by differentiating
equations (4.12) and (4.13) with respect to κ, that u∗ and MESY are both increasing
in κ. As κ effectively represents the speed at which the ecological system reacts,
this means that extra care needs to be taken, when the target species has a low κ
value, for example with whales and sharks that reproduce very slowly.
4.4. Optimal sustainable yield under risk aversion
The pure notion of sustainability, of course, already incorporates a component
of risk aversion. The worst case scenario for a particular fishery is that the fish
population dies out, and economic rents from the species harvested are extinguished.
The fishery may, of course, move to another species, but from an ecological and bio-
conservation point, this case should be avoided at all costs. The numerical example
in Chapter 3 shows that, once the prey becomes extinct, the predator will also
become extinct in the future. Another point, however, is that under a sustainable
fishing effort, the fishery may be willing to trade-off expected sustainable yield for
more certainty, e.g., less variance of the equilibrium distribution. There are several
conceptually different approaches about how to incorporate risk aversion using the
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variance as a measure of risk. One possibility is to use the variance as a penalty
function. Alternatively, one may think of maximizing the expected sustainable yield
under a variance constraint or minimizing variance of the equilibrium distribution
under an expectation constraint. This thesis will examine the first point in this
section and the second point in the next section. More sophisticated approaches
using utility theory or more general risk measures are also possible, but at present
these three elementary ways to model risk aversion will be studied. Considering the
problem
max
u
E {qux (∞, u)} − αV ar (qux (∞, u)) , (4.14)
where α ≥ 0 represents the level of risk aversion. The problem will be solved
by taking advantage of the analytic formulas for first and second moments of the
equilibrium distribution of geometric mean reversion in Ewald and Yang (2008) [?].
It is concluded that
E {qux (∞, u)} − αV ar (qux (∞, u))
= quE {x (∞, u)} − αq2u2E{x2 (∞, u)}+ αq2u2 (E {x (∞, u)})2
=
ασ2q3
2κ2
u3 +
(
ασ4q2
4κ2
− αθσ
2q2
2κ
− q
2
κ
)
u2 +
(
θq − σ
2q
2κ
)
u. (4.15)
Differentiating the latter equation with respect to u and setting the derivative equal
to 0, gives as necessary condition for the optimal fishing effort
3ασ2q3
2κ2
u2 −
(
ασ2q2A
κ
+
2q2
κ
)
u+ qA = 0, (4.16)
where A = θ − σ2
2κ
> 0. Equation (4.16) has two positive roots since
(
ασ2q2A
κ
+
2q2
κ
)2
− 6ασ
2q4A
κ2
=
q4 (ασ2A− 1)2
κ2
+
3q4
κ2
≥ 0.
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These roots are given by
u± =
κ
3ασ2q
[(
ασ2A+ 2
)±√(ασ2A− 1)2 + 3] .
To find out which positive root is the maximizer, the second derivative of equation
(4.15) is computed with respect to u as
3ασ2q3
κ2
u−
(
ασ2q2A
κ
+
2q2
κ
)
.
It can be seen that only u− causes the second derivative of equation (4.15) to be
negative, which therefore implies that u− is the maximizer. Applying de l’Hospital’s
rule, it can easily be seen that in the limit for α tending to 0, this gives expression
(4.13) from u−. This of course is as it should be, as the case α = 0 is the case where
there is no explicit risk aversion. Furthermore it can be shown that u− is decreasing
in α and increasing in κ. Indeed,
∂
∂α
u− =
κ
(
−2
√
(ασ2A− 1)2 + 3 + 4− ασ2A
)
3α2σ2q
√
(ασ2A− 1)2 + 3
≤ 0.
As (4.13) is sustainable and with α increasing and the fishing effort decreasing, the
following is obtained
u∗ = u− =
κ
3ασ2q
[(
ασ2A+ 2
)−√(ασ2A− 1)2 + 3] (4.17)
is indeed sustainable for all α > 0 and therefore represents the optimal sustainable
fishing effort. Substituting u∗ into equation (4.15), gives the optimal expected
sustainable yield (OESY). It can be seen that in the range 2κθ > σ2 ≥ κθ the
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optimal fishing effort u∗ is decreasing in σ. Indeed,
∂
∂σ
u∗ =
κ
3ασ3q



σ(2ασA+ ασ2 ∂
∂σ
A
)1− ασ2A− 1√
(ασ2A− 1)2 + 3




−2
[(
ασ2A+ 2
)−√(ασ2A− 1)2 + 3]}
and 2ασA + ασ2 ∂
∂σ
A ≤ 0 if σ2 ∈ [κθ, 2κθ). As seen above, the optimal fishing
effort is decreasing in the level of risk aversion. While the mathematics behind this
result is sound, its intuition is not trivial. It cannot a priori be said that more risk
aversion causes lower optimal fishing effort. There are essentially two effects here, a
higher fishing effort potentially leads to a lower level of the population, and hence a
lower variance; however, on the other hand, yields become higher and the variance
of the yield may, in fact, increase. These effects are also traded off, with a similar
effect applying to expectation. The result obtained here nevertheless clearly shows
that more risk aversion causes lower optimal fishing effort. The analysis carried out
in this section can easily be extended to take higher moments of the equilibrium
distribution into account. As indicated earlier, all moments can easily be computed
from Merton (1975) [?] or iteratively from Ewald and Yang (2007) [?], and these
moments can be used to construct more complex risk measures. For example it is
possible to study exponential utility and in fact as non-integer moments are also
available, the case of constant relative risk aversion. These cases will be considered
in future work.
4.5. Mean-Variance Analysis of Sustainable Yields
This section will consider an approach which accounts for risk in a slightly
different way than in the previous section. In finance, this approach is classically
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known as mean-variance analysis and thus it will be called the mean variance
analysis of sustainable yields. It is believed that this approach has never been
applied to sustainable yields fishery models before. There are, in principle, two
related problems. These are:
• maximization of expected sustainable yield under limited risk, e.g., variance.
• minimization of risk under guaranteed minimum level of expected sustainable
yield.
Considering the first problem, e.g.
max
u
E {qux(∞)} ,
subject to
V ar(qux(∞)) ≤ L,
2κθ − 2qu− σ2 ≥ 0,
where L > 0 is a constant representing the maximum acceptable risk and the second
constraint is the sustainability condition (4.8); the latter system is equivalent to
min
u
q2
κ
u2 −
(
θ − σ
2
2κ
)
qu
subject to
σ2q3
2κ2
u3 −
(
θσ2
2κ
− σ
4
4κ2
)
q2u2 + L ≥ 0,
−2qu+ 2κθ − σ2 ≥ 0.
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The Kuhn-Tucker theorem will be used to solve this constraint optimization prob-
lem. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
2q2
κ
u−
(
θ − σ
2
2κ
)
q −
[
3σ2q3
2κ2
u2 − 2
(
θσ2
2κ
− σ
4
4κ2
)
q2u
]
µ1 + 2qµ2 = 0[
σ2q3
2κ2
u3 −
(
θσ2
2κ
− σ
4
4κ2
)
q2u2 + L
]
µ1 = 0
(−2qu+ 2κθ − σ2)µ2 = 0
(4.18)
where µ1 and µ2 are non negative. There are four cases to consider:
1. µ1 = µ2 = 0⇒ u∗ = κ
2q
(
θ − σ
2
2κ
)
2. µ1 6= 0, µ2 = 0⇒ u∗ is a positive solution for the cubic function defined by constraint 1
3. µ1 = 0, µ2 6= 0⇒ u∗ = 2κθ − σ
2
2q
4. µ1 6= 0, µ2 6= 0⇒ u∗ = 2κθ − σ
2
2q
, for some L.
Cases 3 and 4 do not provide sustainable yields, but in order to apply the Kuhn-
Tucker theorem, it is necessary to formally allow for these cases. Nevertheless, they
would give E {qu∗x(∞)} = 0 = V ar (qu∗x(∞)) which excludes both cases from
providing maximizers. Note that in the range of sustainable yields 0 ≤ u < 2κθ−σ2
2q
the variance term V ar(qux(∞)) is bounded and therefore, if L is chosen to be
sufficient large, the variance constraint becomes meaningless. In fact this is the case
when L ≥ 4κσ2
27
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)3
. Then case 1 applies and κ
2q
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)
is the maximizer.
Note that this level of fishing effort coincides with (4.12). This is no surprise,
because the acceptable level of risk L is higher than that which can actually be
caused by the fish population under any fishing effort and agents effectively become
risk neutral. If however the acceptable level of risk L is lower than 4κσ
2
27
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)3
,
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then the maximizer is defined via case 2, and it is necessary to solve
σ2q3
2κ2
u3 −
(
θσ2
2κ
− σ
4
4κ2
)
q2u2 + L = 0 (4.19)
and obtain µ1 from the first equation in (5.18). Then, since
σ2q3
2κ2
u3−
(
θσ2
2κ
− σ4
4κ2
)
q2u2
is decreasing when u ∈
[
0, 2κ
3q
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)]
, the equation will lead to a maximizer
which is less than κ
2q
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)
. Note that the cubic (4.19) always has a unique
positive root if L < 4κσ
2
27
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)3
. The reason for this is that the function
σ2q3
2κ2
u3 −
(
θσ2
2κ
− σ4
4κ2
)
q2u2 is decreasing, continuous and has a sign-change on the
interval
[
0, κ
2q
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)]
. As there are analytic formulas for the solution of cubic
equations, (4.19) can in principle be solved. The explicit expression is omitted
at this point, though, because it is quite lengthy and, due to its complexity, it
is difficult to analyse. If the maximizer is given via case 1, it has already been
proved in section 4.3 that both u∗ and MESY are increasing in κ. If the maximizer
is given via case 2, e.g. lower risk tolerance L, and σ2 ∈ [κθ, 2κθ), then since
σ2q3
2κ2
and
(
θσ2
2κ
− σ4
4κ2
)
q2 are decreasing and increasing, respectively, u∗ is decreasing.
Now, considering the second, dual approach, where risk, e.g. variance, is minimized
when keeping expected sustainable yield above a certain level. More precisely, it is
assumed that the fishery tries to solve the following constraint optimization problem:
min
u
V ar(qux(∞)),
subject to
E {qux(∞)} ≥ L,
2κθ − 2qu− σ2 ≥ 0,
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where L ≥ 0 is the lowest expectation that is agreeable for the fishery. This system
is equivalent to
min
u
−σ
2q3
2κ2
u3 +
(
θσ2
2κ
− σ
4
4κ2
)
q2u2,
subject to
−q
2
κ
u2 +
(
θ − σ
2
2κ
)
qu− L ≥ 0,
−2qu+ 2κθ − σ2 ≥ 0.
It is necessary to assume that
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)2
≥ 4L
κ
, as otherwise the first constraint
does not allow any sustainable fishing efforts. This condition follows from the
boundedness from above, of the expected sustainable yields, and if L is above that
boundary the expected sustainable yields simply cannot be achieved. The Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are then
−3σ
2q3
2κ2
u2 + 2
(
θσ2
2κ
− σ
4
4κ2
)
q2u−
[
−2q
2
κ
u+
(
θ − σ
2
2κ
)
q
]
µ1 + 2qµ2 = 0[
−q
2
κ
u2 +
(
θ − σ
2
2κ
)
qu− L
]
µ1 = 0
(−2qu+ 2κθ − σ2)µ2 = 0
(4.20)
where µ1 and µ2 are non negative. There are again four possible cases:
1. µ1 = µ2 = 0⇒ u∗ = 0 or u∗ = 2κ
3q
(
θ − σ
2
2κ
)
,
2. µ1 6= 0, µ2 = 0⇒ u∗ =
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)
±
√(
θ − σ2
2κ
)2 − 4L
κ
2q
κ
,
3. µ1 = 0, µ2 6= 0⇒ u∗ = 2κθ − σ
2
2q
,
4. µ1 6= 0, µ2 6= 0⇒ u∗ = 2κθ − σ
2
2q
, for some L.
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As before, cases 3 and 4 imply E {qu∗x(∞)} = V ar (qu∗x(∞))=0, which is not
an option, unless L = 0, which is unrealistic. It can be proved that the objective
functional is increasing when u ∈
[
0, 2κ
3q
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)]
, which in case 1 would imply that
u∗ = 0. This however again implies E {qu∗x(∞)} = 0 which does not satisfy the
constraint, unless L = 0. Therefore, case 2 applies in all non-trivial cases. Clearly
u∗ ∈


(
θ − σ2
2κ
)
−
√(
θ − σ2
2κ
)2 − 4L
κ
2q
κ
,
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)
+
√(
θ − σ2
2κ
)2 − 4L
κ
2q
κ


satisfies the constraint, the second equation in (4.20). Substituting
(
θ−σ2
2κ
)
±
√(
θ−σ2
2κ
)
2− 4L
κ
2q
κ
into the objective functional, gives
σ2κ
16


(
θ − σ2
2κ
)
±
√(
θ − σ2
2κ
)2 − 4L
κ
2q
κ


2 

(
θ − σ2
2κ
)
∓
√(
θ − σ2
2κ
)2 − 4L
κ
2q
κ


and it can be seen that the minimizer is given by
(
θ−σ2
2κ
)
−
√(
θ−σ2
2κ
)
2− 4L
κ
2q
κ
. Therefore,
the risk-minimizing sustainable effort with agreeable expected sustainable yield L
is given by
u∗ =
(
θ − σ2
2κ
)
−
√(
θ − σ2
2κ
)2 − 4L
κ
2q
κ
. (4.21)
Differentiating the minimizer with respect to σ, gives
∂
∂σ
u∗ =
σ
2q

1− θ − σ22κ√(
θ − σ2
2κ
)2 − 4L
κ

 ≤ 0,
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and it can be observed, again, that the higher the uncertainty is, the lower the
optimal effort. On the other hand, in order to study how κ affects the optimal
fishing effort, it is necessary to compute ∂
∂κ
u∗. Indeed,
∂
∂κ
u∗ =
∂
∂κ
(
2κθ − σ2 −
√
(2κθ − σ2)2 − 16κL
)
4q
=
1
4q

2θ − 4θ (2κθ − σ2)− 16κL
2
√
(2κθ − σ2)2 − 16κL


=
1
4q

2θ

1− 2κθ − σ2√
(2κθ − σ2)2 − 16κL

+ 8L√
(2κθ − σ2)2 − 16κL

 ≥ 0.
The physical interpretation of this is that, when the fishery objective is to minimize
the variance and the mean reversion κ goes up, the population of fish recovers faster
and this causes the variance to be larger. Therefore, fishery agents would prefer to
harvest more fish to reduce the variance. In the authors’ point of view, this last
approach is the most conservative, as the objective here is really a minimization of
risk, e.g. variance, which can be interpreted as keeping the population stable, under
an agreeable minimum expected sustainable yield.
4.6. Numerical Illustration
To illustrate the effect of parameter choice, in particular the uncertainty parame-
ter σ, numerical examples will be provided for each case considered in sections 4.3,
4.4, and 4.5. First assuming that θ = 1 and q = 0.6. Figure 4.1 shows MESY as a
function of κ and σ. It can be seen that MESY is increasing in κ and decreasing in
σ, as we have concluded in section 4.3. Figure 4.2 shows that OESY for approach
1 has similar properties to MESY. The case where the fishery maximizes expected
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yield with variance bounded by a given level L, which is sufficiently low to avoid a
trivial case, is represented in Figure 4.3. It can be seen in this case that the optimal
fishing effort is decreasing in σ and increasing in κ. Moreover it can be seen, that a
larger σ offsets the effect of an increasing mean reversion speed κ, i.e., u∗ increases
in κ significantly more under a lower σ than under a high σ. For the case where
the fisheries’ objective is minimization of the variance under a minimum agreeable
expected sustainable yield, it can be seen from Figure 4.4 that the optimal fishing
effort is increasing in κ and σ.
4.7. Conclusion
This work extends the classical logistic growth-based sustainable yield model to
accommodate uncertainty in terms of a level dependent uncertainty term. The
notion of sustainable yield is introduced in this context, relying on the results of
the equilibrium distribution of geometric mean reversion, and an expression for the
maximum expected sustainable yield has been derived. Furthermore, the case of
risk averse fisheries, which balance expected sustainable yield with risk, has been
considered. This has been measured in terms of the variance of the equilibrium
distribution and the effect of risk aversion on optimal sustainable yields. Finally,
the concept of mean-variance analysis in sustainable fisheries was introduced and
the optimal fishing efforts were derived in this context.
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Graphical Illustration
Figure 4.1: The maximum expected sustainable yield when θ = 1 and q = 0.6
Figure 4.2: The optimal expected sustainable yield under risk aversion when α = 1,
θ = 1 and q = 0.6
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Figure 4.3: The optimal fishing effort for maximizing E {qux(∞)} under V ar(qux(∞)) ≤
L when L = 10−4, θ = 1 and q = 0.6
Figure 4.4: The optimal fishing effort for minimizing V ar(qux(∞)) under E {qux(∞)} ≥
L when L = 0.5, θ = 1 and q = 0.6
Chapter 5
Irreversible investment with
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross type mean
reversion
In this chapter, it is supposed that a financial manager faces an infinite time horizon
and that the discount rate is either given exogenously or is implied by the existence of
a complete spanning asset. This is in common with the approach taken in [?]. It was
indicated in section 1.1 that one application of real option theory in environmental
economics is to model the consumption of resources. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
presented an example where they considered that the price of oil followed a mean
reverting process, see [?], Chapter 12. The main difference that will be seen in
this exposition is that it is assumed that the value of the underlying financial
project follows a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process. In most of the previous work, it was
assumed that the underlying financial project follows a geometric Brownian motion.
It has been argued, however, by many influential authors in the economic literature
that geometric Brownian motion, although convenient and mathematically easy to
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handle, is not a realistic assumption for the project value process: see, for example,
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) [?], Epstein et al. (1998) [?] and Metcalf and Hasset
(1995) [?]. Basic microeconomic theory explains that, in the long run the price
of a commodity ought to be tied to its long-run marginal cost. This feature does
not exist in geometric Brownian motion models, but is present in so called mean
reverting models.
Mean reverting models that have been discussed in the literature include Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck, exponential Ornstein-Uhlenbeck and geometric mean reversion. The
case of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, i.e., a process follows
dx(t) = θ (µ− x(t)) dt+ σdW (t),
where W (t) is a Wiener process, is highly unrealistic as it leads to negative values
of the project value. The remedy for this is to take an exponential of an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process, but the mean reverting structure obtained from this remains
questionable. The most favoured model is the so called geometric mean reversion
process, which is sometimes modified by including an economic growth factor, see
Metcalf and Hasset (1995) [?]. For this process, explicit solutions for the irreversible
investment problem in terms of the Kummer M function ( also called confluent
hypergeometric function ) have been derived by Dixit and Pindyck, while empirical
studies have been undertaken by Metcalf and Hasset (1995) [?]. It can be shown
that the geometric mean reversion process always stays positive and, for suitable
parameter constraints, has good analytical properties, such as the existence of an
equilibrium distribution, see Ewald and Yang (2007) [?].
Geometric mean reversion can be interpreted in two ways: the first is that the
expected relative rate of return of the project value is actually mean reverting, the
second is that the mean reversion speed is proportional to the project value; however,
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this setup is not economically reasonable in all cases. One process which guarantees
a positive project value and has a constant mean reversion speed is the so called Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross process, which will be studied in detail in section 5.1. This process
which was introduced by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) in [?] has been studied in
great detail in the context of interest rate models and stochastic volatility models in
finance. Nevertheless, it has never been used in the context of real option models. In
this chapter, the explicit solution is derived for the irreversible investment problem
under the assumption that the project value follows a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process.
The solution shows various similarities to the case of the geometric mean reversion
case and these are explored by comparative analysis. Certain aspects are then
illustrated, which the authors believe should lead to a general preference for the
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process with regards to the geometric mean reversion process.
5.1. Some facts about the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process
A stochastic process which follows the dynamics
dV (t) = κ (θ − V (t)) dt+ σ
√
V (t)dW (t), (5.1)
with constants κ, θ, σ > 0 and a Wiener process W (t) is generally referred to as
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process, although other names are used from time to time. These
names include, for example, Heston volatility and the square-root process. It can be
shown that the process (5.1) is effectively a re-parameterized squared Bessel process
( see for example Alos and Ewald (2008) [?] ) and has carefully been studied by
various authors since the early 1950’s, most rigorously by Yor (1992) [?]. The process
was introduced into finance as a model for short rate interest by Cox, Ingersoll and
Ross (1985) in [?] to replace the existing Vasiczek model. The Vasiczek model
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suffered from the fact that the interest rate can become negative, a phenomenon
that has only been observed once in Japan, see [?]. Usage of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
process as a model for the short rate leads to an affine term structure model which
can easily be calibrated and this was the key to its success. On a different level,
the same process was used by Heston several years later, to model the volatility of
a stock, see Heston (1993) [?]. The resulting stochastic volatility model has become
known as the Heston model. When compared to the Black-Scholes model, it has the
advantage that it produces volatility smiles, while still being accessible and allowing
analytic formulas for plain vanilla options.
A sophisticated look at the dynamics of (5.1) seems to indicate two potential
problems. The square-root function is not defined for negative values and has infinite
slope at 0. The first problem could potentially be cured by taking the absolute
value inside the square root on the right hand side of equation (5.1). The classical
existence and uniqueness results for solutions of stochastic differential equations,
however, fail, as they assume a Lipschitz condition for the coefficients which is
clearly violated. Using results of Yamada and Watanabe, see Karatzas (1988) [?],
Chapter 5 Proposition 2.18., it can be shown, however, that in the case where the
coefficient condition
2κθ > σ2 (5.2)
holds, a unique strong solution to (5.1) exists for arbitrary positive initial conditions
V (0) = V0 > 0 and that the process remains strictly positive for all times with
probability one. The latter can be concluded from the fact that, under condition
(5.2), the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is a reparameterized squared Bessel process
of dimension greater than 2. The Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process has various other
desirable properties such as smoothness in the Malliavin sense, see Alos and Ewald
(2008) [?], as well as the existence of an equilibrium distribution which is centered
125
around the mean reversion level θ. In particular, examining expectation in (5.1)
shows that it satisfies
E {V (t)} = V0 +
∫ t
0
κ (θ − E {V (t)}) ds,
which therefore implies the ordinary differential equation
d
dt
E {V (t)} = κ (θ − E {V (t)}) , (5.3)
with the initial value condition E {V (0)} = V0. Equation (5.3) can be solved
analytically and leads in particular to
E {V (t)} = θ + (V0 − θ) e−κt. (5.4)
Therefore limt→∞E {V (t)} = θ. This fact makes it possible to interpret the θ
as the parameter which represents the demand/supply market clearing feature in
equilibrium. As Ewald and Yang (2007) showed in [?], the popular geometric mean
reversion model, which they also discuss in section 4, does not satisfy this criterion.
The equilibrium distribution of geometric mean reversion is shifted away from the
mean reversion level θ and the expectation is convergent to θ− σ2
κ
, which is extremely
sensitive to changes in the volatility σ or mean reversion speed κ. As they also
have shown in [?], geometric mean reversion stays strictly positive automatically
without referring to any further coefficient condition, but if the value theoretically
falls to zero (for example by imposing a shock), it remains there forever; if the
same happens to the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process, the infinitesimal drift κθdt will
push the process back to a positive value and cause the system to recover. This
effect may be economically reasonable or not. One example is that if the process
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models the value of a company, a value of 0 could be interpreted as bankruptcy and
all further considerations about the future of this company may end; on the other
hand, another investor may take over the company and bring it back to life if the
stock of the resources is still sufficient. In the case where the reserve of resources
is undeveloped, it may not be realistic that the current value of the resources of
zero causes the value to remain at zero in the future. Putting these hypothetical
considerations aside, on a technical level, the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process produces
more continuity and regularity at V = 0 than the geometric mean reversion process
does. Because of these technical aspects, the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is preferred
over geometric mean reversion. Further arguments will be presented later during
the quantitative analysis.
5.2. Irreversible Investment
The following problem should be considered. The value of an investment project
is given by a stochastic process which follows the dynamics
dV (t) = α(V (t))dt+ σ(V (t))dW (t), (5.5)
with α(V ) and σ(V ) sufficiently smooth functions and W (t) a Wiener process. It
is assumed at this point that α(V ) and σ(V ) satisfy appropriate conditions which
guarantee positivity of the project value for all times. For the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
process such conditions have been given in the previous section, i.e., 2κθ > σ2. An
agent can then choose a time τ to invest into this project for a sunk investment cost
I and by this means to receive a payoff of current value
e−ρτ (V (τ)− I) , (5.6)
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where ρ is a discount rate. In doing this the agent’s objective is to maximize
expected payoff. This leads to an optimal stopping problem
F (V ) = max
τ
E
{
e−ρτ (V (τ)− I) |V (0) = V } , (5.7)
in which τ can be chosen among all stopping times. At the moment it is assumed
that the discount rate is given exogenously. Note that the current model is au-
tonomous and the optimal stopping time has been converted into finding out the
value to invest. The current value of the option to invest, i.e. the value of waiting
to invest at some later time, when more information on the investment project is
revealed, is given by F (V ). The option is exercised and investment is undertaken
when the investment threshold is reached. This leads to the following condition,
which is usually referred to as value-matching condition
F (V ∗) = V ∗ − I. (5.8)
This condition says that the option is exercised, if and only if its intrinsic value
F (V ∗) is equal to its current payoff. In order to guarantee certain differentiability
properties of the value function, a second so called smooth-pasting condition is made
F ′(V ∗) = 1. (5.9)
Finally in the continuation region, i.e., before the option is exercised, the total
expected return on the investment opportunity must be equal to its expected rate
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of capital appreciation. This gives the so called Bellman equation
ρFdt = E {dF} . (5.10)
It follows from the Itoˆ formula and equation (5.5) that
dF (t) = α(V (t))
d
dV (t)
F (V (t))dt+
σ2(V (t))
2
d2
d (V (t))2
F (V (t))dt+σ(V (t))
d
dV (t)
F (V (t))dW (t),
(5.11)
and therefore (5.10) implies that
σ2(V )
2
F ′′(V ) + α(V )F ′(V )− ρF (V ) = 0. (5.12)
Equation (5.12) is a second order ordinary differential equation in which the value
function F (V ) has to satisfy the two conditions (5.8) and (5.9). In general the
solution of a second order ordinary differential equation is uniquely characterized
by two independent conditions for F and F ′, however, in the current problem the
value V ∗ at which F and F ′ are determined is also unknown, and this is called a free
boundary problem. In order to obtain a unique solution it is therefore necessary
to introduce a third condition. The classically used dynamics, geometric Brownian
motion and geometric mean reversion techniques, both lead to fixed points at V = 0;
this condition is usually taken to be
F (0) = 0. (5.13)
This condition has to be interpreted in a way that, once the value of the investment
project has hit zero, it stays zero forever and the option to invest has therefore lost
all of its value. This assumption will be discussed further in the framework of the
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Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process and the authors will later argue that it makes sense to
replace this condition by a finiteness condition
F (0) <∞. (5.14)
Furthermore, this will not affect the analysis of the classical cases. To solve the
optimal investment problem, it is therefore necessary to solve (5.12) with respect to
(5.8), (5.9) and (5.13). Note that in general, and this includes the classical cases,
at least one of the equations (5.8) and (5.9) has to be solved numerically. The
main critique of the approach presented above is that the discount rate ρ is given
exogenously and, in general, it is hard to specify. In the following, the author and
his supervisor present an alternative approach to compute the value of the option
to invest, which is based on classical contingent claims analysis. This concept was
mentioned in section 1.2, and it assumes that there exists a financial asset which
is traded on a liquid market, and whose price dynamic is driven by the same noise
generating process as the project value, in this case one dimensional Brownian
motion W (t). Such an asset is generally referred to as a total spanning asset. It is
assumed that the traded asset has a risk adjusted expected rate of return µ and is
therefore paying a risk premium of µ−r. According to equation (5.1), the expected
rate of return of the investment project is α(V )
V
. It is important to stress again
that the investment project is not understood as a tradable asset. If, however,
theoretically it was, then for arbitrage reasons it would need to pay a dividend rate
of
δ(V ) = µ− α(V )
V
. (5.15)
Here it is assumed that the tradable asset has the same volatility structure. The
option to invest can now be identified with a perpetual option on this dividend pay-
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ing hypothetical stock. The classical approach of constructing a riskless portfolio,
which contains the option F (V ) and a certain number of shares of stock V , then
leads to the following differential equation
1
2
σ2(V )F ′′(V ) + (r − δ(V ))V F ′(V )− rF (V ) = 0 (5.16)
The two conditions (5.8) and (5.9) remain the same. The advantage of (5.16) is
that it does not include the discount rate ρ, which is generally difficult to specify.
On the other hand, the contingent claims approach depends on the existence of a
total spanning asset. This assumption is in some cases unrealistic. See Ewald and
Yang [?] for a utility based approach, which operates in the presence of a partial
spanning asset and includes risk aversion toward idiosyncratic risk. These ideas are
not, however, followed up in the current chapter.
5.3. The classical cases : Geometric Brownian motion and geometric
mean reversion
This section will present the analysis introduced above for the two classical cases
where the project value is modelled as a geometric Brownian motion and as a
geometric mean reversion process. In the case of geometric Brownian motion,
dV (t) = α · V (t)dt+ σ · V (t)dW (t), (5.17)
which in the notation of the previous section gives
α(V (t)) = α · V (t), σ(V (t)) = σ · V (t). (5.18)
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In this case (5.12) translates to
1
2
σ2V 2F ′′(V ) + αV F ′(V )− ρF = 0. (5.19)
Since in the ordinary differential equation above V occurs with the same power as
derivatives are taken, it follows that the value function is of the type
F (V ) = C1V
β1 + C2V
β2 . (5.20)
Substitution of this into equation (5.19) leads to
[
C1β1(β1 − 1)σ2
2
+ C1αβ1 − C1ρ
]
V β1 +
[
C2β2(β2 − 1)σ2
2
+ C2αβ2 − C2ρ
]
V β2 = 0,
and then we have
β1 =
−
(
α− σ2
2
)
+
√(
α− σ2
2
)2
+ 2σ2ρ
σ2
, (5.21)
β2 =
−
(
α− σ2
2
)
−
√(
α− σ2
2
)2
+ 2σ2ρ
σ2
, (5.22)
which are the two solutions of the so called characteristic equations. Obviously it
is assumed that β2 < 0 and this guarantees a finite option value at V = 0, or, in
this case equivalently (5.13) it is necessary to choose C2 = 0. Denoting C = C1 and
β = β1 then gives
F (V ) = CV β, (5.23)
where C and V ∗ are then determined from (5.5) and (5.6). Using the contingent
claims approach, it can be shown that the implied proportional dividend rate (5.15)
is in fact constant and equations (5.12) and (5.16) are formally identical, with ρ
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replaced by r and α replaced by r− µ− α. The solution for F (V ) can then simply
be obtained from (5.23) and (5.21) by substituting these values. In the case of
geometric mean reversion we have
dV (t) = κ(θ − V (t))V (t)dt+ σV (t)dW (t), (5.24)
which in the notation of the previous section corresponds to the choices
α(V (t)) = κ(θ − V (t)) · V (t), σ(V (t)) = σ · V (t), (5.25)
and therefore (5.12) translates to
1
2
σ2V 2F ′′(V ) + κ(θ − V )V F ′(V )− ρF (V ) = 0. (5.26)
From the particular form of this differential equation, it can be assumed that the
solution is of the type F (V ) = V βh(V ). On substitution in (5.26) it can be inferred
that
β1 =
1
2
− κθ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− κθ
σ2
)2
+
2ρ
σ2
(5.27)
β2 =
1
2
− κθ
σ2
−
√(
1
2
− κθ
σ2
)2
+
2ρ
σ2
(5.28)
and
F (V ) = C1V
β1h1(V ) + C2V
β2h2(V ), (5.29)
with hi(V ) satisfying
1
2
σ2V h′′i (V ) + (σ
2βi + κ(θ − V ))h′i(V )− κβihi(V ) = 0. (5.30)
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The function hi(V ) can be identified as a Kummer M functions, compared with the
discussion in the next section. The Kummer M function however, takes the value
1 at V = 0 and therefore, as the exponent β2 is clearly negative, it is necessary to
impose the condition C2 = 0 in order to obtain a finite value for the option to invest
at V = 0, i.e. condition (5.14) holds. Solving the equation for h1 then gives
F (V ) = CV βM
(
β, 2β +
2κθ
σ2
,
2κ
σ2
V
)
, (5.31)
with C = C1, β = β1 and M(a, b, x) denoting the Kummer M function which is
also known under the name confluent hypergeometric function: see Abramowitz and
Stegun (1972) [?]. The values of C and V ∗ have to be determined from (5.31) in
addition to (5.8) and (5.9). Using the contingent claims approach, it is found that
in the case of geometric mean reversion the implied proportional dividend rate is
given by δ(V ) = µ− κ(θ − V ). In this case equation (5.16) becomes
1
2
σ2V 2F ′′(V ) + κ
((
θ +
r − µ
κ
)
− V
)
V F ′(V )− rF (V ) = 0, (5.32)
which is equivalent to (5.26) via the substitution of r for ρ and θ+ r−µ
κ
for θ. Using
these values in (5.27) and (5.31) leads to
F (V ) = CV βM
(
β, 2β +
2(r − µ+ κθ)
σ2
,
2κ
σ2
V
)
, (5.33)
with
β =
1
2
+
(µ− r − κθ)
σ2
+
√(
1
2
+
µ− r − κθ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
. (5.34)
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5.4. Solution for Cox-Ingersoll-Ross type project value
In this section, it is assumed that the dynamic project value is given by a Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross process whose dynamic is given by (5.1). It is believed that this
process has never been used before in the theory of real options and irreversible
investment, even though it has significant advantages compared to the classical
choices of geometric Brownian motion and geometric mean reversion. This was
discussed in section 5.1 and will be expanded upon in the next section. In the
notation of section 5.2
α(V (t)) = κ(θ − V (t)), σ(V (t)) = σ
√
V (t). (5.35)
This has two fundamental differences when compared to the geometric mean re-
version process (2.24). Firstly, the mean reversion speed is not level dependent
and secondly, the variance is proportional to the current level V (t) rather than the
standard deviation. Applying the general methodology introduced in section 1.2
produces
σ2V
2
F ′′(V ) + κ(θ − V )F ′(V )− ρF (V ) = 0. (5.36)
The value function of the irreversible investment problem F (V ) must therefore
satisfy (5.36) with respect to the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, i.e.,
equations (5.8) and (5.9). The following section will show explicitly how to solve
this differential equation. Dividing equation (5.36) by 1
k
and using the following
transformation
a :=
ρ
κ
, b :=
2κθ
σ2
, z :=
2κ
σ2
v, (5.37)
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and furthermore writing F (v) = w
(
2κ
σ2
v
)
leads to the following differential equation
for w(z):
zw′′(z) + (b− z)w′(z)− aw(z) = 0 (5.38)
This is the well known Kummer equation. It has two fundamental solutions from
which all solutions can be obtained by linear combinations. These are the Kummer
M function and the Kummer U function. These are classically denoted with
M(a, b, z) for Kummer M and U(a, b, z) for Kummer U . The Kummer U function
can be expressed in terms of the Kummer M and its use can be avoided, see [?],
equation 13.1.3. From this, the general solution to equation (5.36) is given by
F (V ) = C1M
(
ρ
κ
,
2κθ
σ2
,
2κ
σ2
V
)
+ C2U
(
ρ
κ
,
2κθ
σ2
,
2κ
σ2
V
)
. (5.39)
The Kummer M and U functions show the following extremal behaviour for the
limit V → 0
lim
z→0
M(a, b, z) = 1 (5.40)
lim
z→0
U(a, b, z) = ∞ (5.41)
From this it becomes clear that the condition F (0) = 0 cannot be satisfied in any
case but the trivial one C1 = C2 = 0. This choice, however, would not satisfy
the value-matching and smooth-pasting condition and, furthermore, it would be
economically unreasonable. It is therefore necessary to relax this condition. In
terms of the discussion at the beginning, this is perfectly natural and economically
sound. The option value at V = 0 must be positive as the dynamic of the Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross process at V = 0 drives the project to a strictly positive value in an
instantaneous amount of time. Note that formally substituting the value V (t) = 0
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into the dynamic (5.1) gives a strictly positive drift of κθdt. This behaviour of the
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is fundamentally different than in the classical cases. In
order to avoid F (0) = ∞ which is economically unreasonable , it is necessary to
choose C2 = 0. It can be seen that, by working with the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process
as a model for the project value, the classical condition (5.13) needs to be replaced
with condition (5.14). It was demonstrated in section 5.3 that this replacement does
not have any effect on the solution of the classical cases. In the classical cases, (5.14)
in fact implies (5.13) and therefore it is proposed to make this adjustment in general.
The property of the current model that the option value at V = 0 is not zero however
clearly distinguishes the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross based irreversible investment problem
from the classical ones. In the author and his supervisor’s opinion, this makes the
assumption of a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process much more realistic, when the project
is able to resurface after it has hit bankruptcy. It is now necessary to choose the
parameters C1 and the investment threshold V
∗ such that the smooth-pasting and
value-matching conditions are satisfied. Starting with the smooth-pasting condition
(5.9), this condition leads to the equation
C1 =
κθ
ρM
(
ρ
κ
+ 1, 2κθ
σ2
+ 1, 2κ
σ2
V ∗
) . (5.42)
Solving for C1 and substituting this value in (5.39) gives
F (V ) =
κθM
(
ρ
κ
, 2κθ
σ2
, 2κ
σ2
V
)
ρM
(
ρ
κ
+ 1, 2κθ
σ2
+ 1, 2κ
σ2
V ∗
) (5.43)
with V ∗ the unique solution of (5.8). In common with the case of geometric
mean reversion where the Kummer M function occurs as well, it is not possible
to solve the value-matching equation analytically; instead, it is necessary to use
numerical methods. This, however, is no more challenging than in the geometric
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mean reversion case. Moving on to the case where the option to invest is evaluated
with the contingent claims approach, in this case the resulting differential equation
for the option value is
σ2V
2
F ′′(V ) + [κ(θ − V ) + (r − µ)V ]F ′(V )− rF (V ) = 0. (5.44)
Denoting
κ˜ := κ+ µ− r (5.45)
θ˜ :=
κθ
κ+ µ− r , (5.46)
it can be seen that (5.44) is identical to (5.36) where κ and θ are replaced by κ˜
and θ˜ and ρ is replaced by r. The value function F (V ) for the option to invest is
therefore given by
F (V ) = CM
(
r
κ+ µ− r ,
2κθ
σ2
,
2(κ+ µ− r)
σ2
V
)
(5.47)
with C given by
C =
κθ
rM
(
r
κ+µ−r + 1,
2κθ
σ2
+ 1, 2(κ+µ−r)
σ2
V ∗
) (5.48)
and V ∗ determined by (5.9). As the Kummer M function gives the value 1 for
V = 0, C is identified as the value of the option at V = 0.
5.5. Qualitative and Quantitative differences to the classical choices
This section presents several numerical examples and it can be seen that the
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is a more natural option within a real option framework
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than the geometric mean reversion process. In order to achieve this, numerical
results for the geometric mean reversion dynamic (5.24) will be reproduced, as
obtained by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) [?], Figures 5.11-5.17, pages 164-170. The
same parameters will then be used with the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process dynamics
defined by (5.1), and in this way it is possible to make precise comparisons and
highlight the differences between the two approaches. Note that Dixit and Pindyck
used a slightly different notation in which κ and θ map to η and V¯ , respectively, and
the common parameters which remain unchanged in all cases are the interest rate
r = 0.04, the volatility parameter σ = 0.2 and the sunk cost I = 1. The following
observations relate to the figures in Graphical Illustration. Odd numbered figures
correspond to the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process, while even numbered figures refer to
the geometric mean reversion process.
Figures 5.1 to 5.6 show the dependence of the value of the option to invest F (V )
with respect to the project value V . It can be seen that, in all cases, a higher
value of the mean reversion parameter θ leads to a higher value of the option and,
furthermore, that the value of the option is increasing with regard to the project
value V . This makes sense from an economic point of view. For a rather small
mean reversion speed κ = 0.05 the value functions in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 appear,
at least from a qualitative point of view, to be very similar. A difference that
can be observed is that the graphs in Figure 5.1 all start from a strictly positive
value while in Figure 5.2, they all start at 0. This is expected from the analysis
in section 5.1, 5.3 and 5.4. The same behaviour can be observed in Figure 5.3
and 5.4 where the mean reversion speed is increased to κ = 0.1. For the higher
mean reversion level considered here, θ = 1.5, however, it can now be seen that,
in the case of geometric mean reversion, i.e., Figure 5.4, the value function has a
slightly awkward bend and is qualitatively very different than the corresponding
139
value function for the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process. Increasing the mean reversion
speed further to κ = 0.5 reinforces this effect. Note in Figure 5.6, the graph for the
value function still starts at F (0) = 0 and with an almost infinite slope to attain
a similar level to the value function for the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross analogue. Within
the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross framework, i.e. Figure 5.5, the value function starts at a
finite positive level and has an upward bend. Further raising the speed of mean
reversion increases this characteristic. The result is that, in the geometric mean
reversion framework, the value of the option to invest is extremely sensitive with
respect to small changes, when the value of the project is low.In both the author and
his supervisor’s opinion, it is much too sensitive, even with reasonable parameter
choices. In contrast, the value function in the Cox- Ingersoll-Ross framework shows
a very regular behaviour for small project values and should therefore be considered
to be the preferred choice.
Figures 5.7 to 5.10 display the dependence of the investment threshold V ∗ with
respect to the mean reversion speed κ in each of the two cases, for high and low
return rate µ of the hedging asset. Figure 5.7 and 5.9 only display the range starting
from κ = 0.1 since the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross dynamic is only well defined under the
condition 2κθ > σ2 and lower values cause problems with the numerical solution
routine. It can be seen that investment thresholds in the geometric mean reversion
model are generally higher than in the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross framework. A closer
inspection of Figure 5.8 and 5.10 shows that in the case of a high mean reversion
level θ = 1.5 the critical value V ∗ does not demonstrate monotonic behaviour.
In the parameter range studied, the effect is, however, rather insignificant. More
significant is the common property between the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross framework and
the geometric mean reversion framework, that depending on whether the current
value is higher or lower than the mean reversion level, θ, the investment threshold
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is initially decreasing or increasing with respect to the mean reversion speed κ.
Figures 5.11 to 5.14 display the dependence of the investment threshold on the
return rate of the hedging asset. Here the qualitative behavior in the two case
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross and geometric mean reversion is very similar, but again the
investment threshold under the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross dynamic is significantly lower
than under the geometric mean reversion dynamic. In all cases the investment
threshold V ∗ is decreasing with the return rate µ. Economically, this can be
explained by the fact that increases in µ lead to increases in the implied proportional
dividend yield (5.15), and increasing the dividend yield provides an incentive to
exercise the option earlier, therefore lowering V ∗.
5.6. Conclusions
An explicit solution has been derived for the value function for the option of
irreversible investment into a project whose value is modelled as a Cox-Ingersoll-
Ross process. The results have been compared with the classical ones obtained
for the cases of geometric Brownian motion and geometric mean reversion. This
includes a numerical analysis and graphical illustrations. The various advantages
of the Cox- Ingersoll-Ross process with respect to the geometric mean reversion
process have been examined and discussed.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis presents several applications of the differential game theory and real
option approaches in environmental economics. Note that all models presented in
the thesis are theoretical models, not empirical models. Differential game theory has
been used to study games defined in continuous time and a differential game model
contains objective functionals for each player and states equations given by some
differential equations. On the other hand, due to the role played by uncertainty, it
is possible to consider the state equations as stochastic differential equations, which
allows study of how uncertainty affects the models. The technique used to solve the
stochastic differential games is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, which lead
to a system of differential equations. Differential game theory is widely applied in
several fields such as management, finance and economics.
The applications of stochastic differential games presented in this thesis are public
goods and fisheries. In Chapter 2, the author has considered a public good whose
property is that suffering is caused by it if the value is sufficiently high. One example
of this is over-development of environmental resources. Two types of uncertainty
have been analyzed and it has been demonstrated that higher risk reinforces the free
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ride effect, which is opposite to the prediction that increased uncertainty reduces
free rider effect. Since each agent’s revenue is offset by a higher uncertainty, it leads
to a more apparent free ride effect.
On the other hand, over-conservation of environmental resources may lead eco-
nomic development to be hampered and it leads to one extension of Chapter 2.
Stratford (2008) studied the case of the island of Tasmania in Australia and notes
”Conflicts over conservation and development emerged again over the period from
1989 to 1994 when the Tasmanian State Government, led by Premier Michael Field,
confronted a fiscal crisis and was subject to intense local pressures to embrace the
new international rhetoric of sustainable development as it had been conceived in the
Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987)
and gained momentum via Australian Government strategies for ecological sustain-
able development”, see [?]. Therefore, when considering development, governments
and individuals should also be concerned with conservation, i.e., it is important to
avoid both over-development and over-conservation.
In Chapters 3 and 4, the fishery problem has been studied. This thesis analyses
how market prices, individual costs and the interactions between species affect the
harvest rates for fishery agents. Two different cases of ecological system have been
examined, i.e. a competitive, and a predator-prey system. Different competitive
arrangements between the fishery agents have also been analysed, i.e. the case
where fishery agents are competing, where they are allowed to catch a single species,
and where they cooperate. In the case of the competitive ecological system, the
results demonstrate that, both economically and ecologically, cooperation may be
a better option, while in a predator-prey system, cooperation may lead species
to become extinct earlier. It can be seen that under some conditions the prey
may become extinct easily, which in turn causes the predator to lack food and
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also become extinct. In the model presented, it was assumed that the price for
each species was not dependent on the other species. This may not be realistic
in some cases, but this simplification makes it possible to solve the model semi-
analytically. The numerical example generated shows that, under a predator-prey
system, both species become extinct. Therefore, to provide data to support the
possibility of policy management, the stochastic version of maximum sustainable
yield is developed in Chapter 4. Several different cases have been analyzed and it
has been identified that the impact of a sufficiently high uncertainty always leads
to a lower optimal harvest rate.
Fisheries have suffered from climate change and the model presented identifies
how fishermen choose harvest rates under conditions of higher uncertainty. On the
other hand, some regulatory policies have already been introduced by governments
such as imposing a tax on fish caught and individual quota management. These
policies lead to some extensions of Chapter 3 and 4. The former has been examined
by Pradhan and Chaudhuri (1999) [?], where they studied a deterministic model in
which the regulatory agent imposes a tax to control the harvest rates. Arnason, on
the other hand, introduced the idea of an individual quota system and adopted it
in 1975, the first in the world. Quota systems have been applied in many countries
such as the United States, Australia and the Republic of Chile. The mechanism
used involves the allocation of quotas to each fishery and the sum of all quotas is
less than the total allowable catch (TAC). Agents are allowed to trade the quotas
in a market. One advantage of quota systems is that agents have more incentive to
invest in their equipment so that they catch fish more efficiently and reduce their
costs. More details can be found in the report by Hatcher, Pascoe, Banks and
Arnason (2002) [?]. Arnason also presented a paper in 1998 in which he studied a
continuous model with a single agent and adopted the individual transferable share
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quota system, see [?]. In this system the agents trade shares in the market instead
of the number of quotas. Since the sum of quotas is limited and there should be
several agents in the market, it would be worthwhile investigating a game model of
an individual transferable quota system.
The real option approach is used to derive an optimal stopping time for an
irreversible investment. Two examples of an irreversible investment are investing in
undeveloped oil reserves and adopting new policies. The former example involves
a huge amount of capital and firms have to consider the optimal timing to invest
in undeveloped oil reserves, while in the latter example, authorities are concerned
about the fact that the policies affect both development and conservation. These
policies, therefore, lead authorities to consider the optimal timing to adopt these
policies. It has been proposed that the project value follows a stochastic differential
equation and then the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation leads to a differential
equation. This differential equation is associated with two conditions, namely value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions, which leads to a free boundary value
problem.
In Chapter 5, the real option approach was applied to study the case of a Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross process which follows the form,
dx(t) = κ (θ − x(t)) dt+ σ
√
x(t)dW (t),
under the scenario in [?], Chapter 5. A Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process represents a
project which can recover, i.e. if the value reaches 0, it increases immediately. This
occurs, for example, with the price of oil. Even though the stock of oil is reduced
permanently, the stock so far is still sufficient to meet demand and represents one
of the world’s main resources. The example given in [?], Chapter 12 C, is based on
a geometric mean reverting process. Since such processes remain at zero if zero is
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ever achieved, it is worth considering that the price of some non renewable resources
are defined by a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process. The reason for this is that the main
resources are still needed and, if the price drops too low, it would be expected to
increase. It has been demonstrated that, in the case of a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process,
the value around 0 is regular while in the case of a geometric mean reverting process,
the value increases dramatically. Such phenomenon may not be realistic.
On the other hand, real option theory can be applied to other problems in environ-
mental economics. One example is anti-pollution. Two examples of such a problem
have been reported. In 2006, over a thousand villagers from the village of Mehdiganj
in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh protested at the headquarters of the
Coca-Cola Company in Gurgaon because of polluted groundwater and soil. The
second illustration refers to an event that took place in China in 2005. According
to a report by AsiaNews, see [?], 60,000 Chinese people in Huaxi Village, Zhejiang
Province protested in April 2005 against high levels of pollution emitted by 13
chemical plants located in the area. Real option theory can be applied to find the
optimal timing when a firm should adopt the pollution abatement facilities. Such
an application also provides governments several policies how to help the firms to
invest in the pollution abatement facilities earlier.
The models presented in this thesis are either based on the real option theory or
a differential game due to the requirements of mathematical tractability. However,
some applications such as exploitation of environmental resources could be relevant
to both techniques. For example, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Repub-
lic of Kiribati is around 3.5 million km2 ,which is a significant tuna fishing zone for
industrial fleets from a number of distant-water fishing nations (DWFNs) including
Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the United States, and Spain. The current situation is that
foreign fishery companies buy licenses to catch fish in the fishery zone and this is
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one of the major sources of revenue for the country. Instead of selling licenses, the
government could consider the idea of imposing a tax on fish caught by foreign
companies. To catch fish in Kiribati, the foreign company is required to invest
in equipment such as vessels and warehouses in Kiribati. In this case, a foreign
company has to concentrate on two aspects, i.e., the optimal timing when it should
invest in the country and the harvest rate. The former represents a good case for
applying the real option approach, while the latter could be a differential game
among the government and all fishery agents. Such applications allow combination
of both techniques in order to study more realistic models.
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